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12. Law Is Not or Must Not 
Be Just Verbal and Visual in 
the 21st Century: Toward 
Multisensory Law
Dr. Colette R. Brunschwig*
Humans are multisensory beings and live in a multisensory world. Human 
communication involves  the production and perception of  messages,  as 
well  as  the  five  senses  (hearing,  vision,  touch,  taste,  and  smell).  Mul-
timodal  or  multisensory  systems  are  capable  of  receiving  and  sending 
information by using various sensory channels  involving vision, hearing, 
and movement, but preferably all five senses. Such computer systems are 
used not only in human communication but also in machine communica-
tion. These systems have brought forth a trend toward multisensory digital 
communication practices  in the  21st  century.  Such multisensory  digital 
media help us produce meaning by using two or more discrete sign systems 
(i.e.,  audio-visual,  visual-kinaesthetic,  tactile-kinaesthetic,  and  so  forth). 
The advent of digital media and their implications for the law has promp-
ted some scholars to suggest that a visual turn is also occurring in the legal 
context. Whereas this may be partly true, by restricting or confining the 
law to the verbal and visual,  legal discourse has difficulties in becoming 
sufficiently aware of multisensory digital media and thus fails to adequately 
explore these media and their impact on the law—in overt contradiction to 
the growing significance of such media. Overemphasising both verbal and 
visual  legal  communication  leads  to  marginalising  or  even  to  ignoring 
other modalities of already existing or future digital legal communication. 
Given these problems, this paper seeks to develop tentative answers to five 
key questions: 1. What is multisensory law? 2. What are the impacts of 
multisensory  digital  media  on the law?  3.  How could or rather should 
greater awareness be raised in legal discourse about the current and future 
relevance of multisensory digital media for the law? 4. How could or rather 
should the marginalising and ignoring of multisensory digital legal com-
* Department of Law, University of Zurich.
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munication practices be challenged? 5. How are these research questions 
relevant to legal discourse, particularly legal history, legal informatics, legal 
pedagogy,  legal  psychology,  and legal  theory?  In addressing these  ques-
tions, this paper draws on insights from different legal and non-legal dis-
ciplines, such as the anthropology of the senses, communication studies, 
legal  history,  legal  informatics,  legal  psychology  (therapeutic  jurispru-
dence),  legal  theory,  multisensory  law,  perceptual  psychology,  and  so 
forth.
12.1. Introduction
12.1.1. Background
12.1.1.1. Humans as multisensory beings in a multisensory 
world
The title  of this  section is  inspired by PAGLIANO, the author of  The  
Multisensory Handbook, who observes that ‘Our senses connect our brains 
to the concrete world (including our bodies) and they are essential for our 
survival. There is still much debate as to exactly how many different senses 
we have, whether the number is five, sixteen or even higher, and their relat-
ive importance to each other. Needless to say,  we are multisensory beings  
and we live in a multisensory world [my emphases].’1
It is beyond the scope of this paper to either debate or determine the 
number of human senses. Crucially, our surroundings address more than 
just one of our senses at a time.
12.1.1.2. Multimodal or multisensory systems (interfaces)
Currently, we are witnessing the emergence of multimodal or multisensory 
systems (interfaces). OVIATT describes such systems as follows:
‘Multimodal systems process two or more combined user input modes
—such as speech, pen, touch, manual gestures, gaze, and head, and body 
movements—in a coordinated manner with multimedia output. This class 
of systems represents a new direction for computing, and a paradigm shift 
1 Paul Pagliano,  The Multisensory Handbook: A Guide for Children and Adults with  
Sensory Learning Disabilities (London, New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), 3.
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away from conventional Windows, Icons, Menus, and Pointer interfaces.’2 
This new category of interfaces, she continues, ‘aims to recognize naturally 
occurring forms of human language and behaviour, which incorporate at 
least one recognition-based technology (e.g., speech, pen, vision).’3 
She concludes with the following prediction, which I quote in full: 
‘The  advent  of  multimodal  interfaces  based  on  recognition  of  human 
speech, gaze, gesture, and other natural behavior represents only the begin-
ning of a progression toward computational interfaces capable of relatively 
human-like sensory perception. Such interfaces eventually will interpret con-
tinuous input from a large number of different visual, auditory, and tactile 
input modes, which will be recognized as users engage in everyday activit-
ies. The same system will track and incorporate information from multiple  
sensors on the user’s  interface  and surrounding physical  environment in 
order to support intelligent adaption to the user, task, and usage environ-
ment. Future adaptive multimodal-multisensor interfaces have the potential 
to support new functionality,  to achieve unparalleled robustness,  and to 
perform flexibility  as  a  multifunctional  and personalized mobile  system 
[my emphases].’4
One could  consider  the emerging  multisensory  brain-computer  inter-
faces (BCIs) as examples or rather applications of multimodal or multis-
ensory systems. According to WAGNER, DALY, & VÄLJAMÄE, ‘[i]n the 
last  two  decades  multisensory  research  has  clearly  demonstrated  that 
human perception  and cognition  is  largely  multisensory  … which  may 
have  important  implications  for  future  BCI  systems  development.  The 
shift  from  the  traditional  unisensory  view  on  brain  sensory  processing 
towards a multisensory one can have a strong impact on a number of dif-
ferent applications.’5
2 Sharon Oviatt,  ‘Multimodal Interfaces’,  The Human-Computer Interaction Hand-
book: Fundamentals, Evolving Technologies, and Emerging Applications, 3rd ed., ed. 
Julie A. Jacko (Boca Raton, London, New York, NY: CRC Press, 2012), 405, 405-
429.
3 Ibid.
4 Oviatt,  ‘Multimodal  Interfaces’,  495. On multimodal  interfaces,  see  also  Borko 
Furht,  ‘Multimodal  Interfaces’, Encyclopedia  of  Multimedia  A-Z,  2nd ed.  Borko 
Furht (New York, NY: Springer, 2008), 650-651.
5 Isabella C. Wagner, Ian Daly, & Aleksander Väljamäe, ‘Non-visual and Multisens-
ory BCI Systems: Present and Future.’ Towards Practical Brain-Computer Interfaces:  
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12.1.1.3. Multisensory digital rhetoric
Multimodal  or  multisensory  systems  impact  digital  rhetoric.  That  is, 
digital rhetoric shifts from a unisensory mode (i.e., visual, auditory, tactile, 
and so forth) to a multisensory one (i.e., audio-visual, tactile-kinaesthetic, 
visual-kinaesthetic, and so forth). Or, as HOCK states, ‘The screen itself is 
a tablet that combines words,  interfaces,  icons, and pictures that invoke 
other modalities like touch and sound. But because modern information 
technologies construct meaning as simultaneously verbal, visual and inter-
active hybrids, digital rhetoric  simply assumes the use of visual rhetoric  as  
well as other modalities [my emphases].’6
Even SHERWIN, a US-American advocate of visual jurisprudence,7 that 
is,  of  both  unisensory and  ocularocentric jurisprudence,  discusses  ‘mul-
ti-modal [my  emphasis]  communication  technologies’8 and  how  ‘they 
affect the content and meaning of law’.9 Moreover, he uses ‘multimodal’ 
(i.e., multisensory) as follows: ‘Through a close study of the discourse used 
by legal (and non-legal) actors in a variety of legal settings, including visual 
and  multi-modal [my emphasis]  digital  forms  of  discourse,  we find not 
only strategic clues how a particular judge or advocate may nestle his or 
her theory of the case within a familiar story genre …’10 Despite SHER-
WIN’s broad sensory view on legal persuasion in different legal contexts, 
he actually refers only to what he—in sensorial terms—calls ‘visual persua-
sion [my emphasis]’,  that  is,  persuasion  limited  to  addressing  only  one 
human sense.11
Bridging the Gap from Research to Real-World Applications, eds. Brendan Z. Allison 
et al. (Heidelberg et al.: Springer, 2012), 375, 375-393.
6 Mary E. Hocks, ‘Understanding Visual Rhetoric in Digital Writing Environments.’ 
College Composition and Communication, Vol. 54, No. 4 (2003), 631, 629-656.
7 Richard K. Sherwin, Visualizing Law in the Age of the Digital Baroque: Arabesques  
and Entanglements (London, New York,  NY:  Routledge,  2011),  13-55,  and id., 
‘Constitutional Purgatory: Shades and Presences Inside the Courtroom.’ Visualizing  
Law and Authority:  Essays  on Legal Aesthetics,  ed.  Leif Dahlberg (Berlin, Boston, 
MA: De Gruyter, 2012), 270, 288, 289, and 290, 266-291.
8 Id., ‘A Manifesto for Visual Legal Realism.’ Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, Vol. 
40, Issue 3 (2007), 719, 719-744.
9 Id., ‘A Manifesto for Visual Legal Realism,’ 719-720.
10 Id., ‘A Manifesto for Visual Legal Realism,’ 720-721. See also id., ‘A Manifesto for 
Visual Legal Realism,’ 738.
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12.1.2. Problems
12.1.2.1. Law as text: verbocentrism in the legal context
KATSH calls the law ‘a text-oriented universe’.12 It is no surprise to him 
‘that machines with powerful capabilities for processing text would find 
the law to be a lucrative market.’13 In  Law on Display, FEIGENSON & 
SPIESEL note that  ‘Law has  traditionally  been about words:  trial  testi-
mony and oral argument, statutes and judicial opinions, negotiations and 
jury deliberations.’14 Elsewhere,  they observe that  ‘Law,  like  most  other 
disciplines or practices that aspire to rationality, has tended to identify that 
rationality (and hence its virtue) with texts rather than pictures, with read-
ing  words  rather  than  ‘reading’  pictures,  to  the  point  that  it  is  often 
thought that thinking in words is the only kind of thinking there is.’15
RÜTHERS, FISCHER, & BIRK, three German-speaking legal theor-
ists, claim that ‘[n]o law exists outside language [my translation]’.16 Thus, 
traditional legal literacy involves reading and writing legal and legally relev-
ant texts, and of course verbal rhetoric (for instance, in court proceedings). 
In the legal context, the verbocentric paradigm remains dominant to this 
day. This paradigm ‘implies that legal actors, whether they are legal schol-
ars or practitioners, equate the law with written or spoken language.’17
11 See the Visual Persuasion Project website at: http://www.nyls.edu/centers/projects/ 
visual_persuasion (last accessed on 4 February 2013).
12 M. Ethan Katsh, Law in a Digital World (New York, NY, Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press,  1995),  146. Similarly, see Peter Wahlgren,  ‘Visualization of the Law,’  
Legal Stagings:  The Visualization, Medialization and Ritualization of Law in Lan-
guage, Literature, Media, Art and Architecture, eds. Kjell Å Modéer & Martin Sun-
nquist (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2012), 19, 19-24.
13 Katsh, Law in a Digital World, 146.
14 Neal Feigenson & Christina Spiesel, Law on Display: The Digital Transformation of  
Legal  Persuasion  and  Judgment (New  York,  NY,  London:  New York  University 
Press, 2009), xi.
15 Id., Law on Display, 4.
16 Bernd  Rüthers,  Christian  Fischer,  &  Axel  Birk,  Rechtstheorie  mit  Juristischer  
Methodenlehre (Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 2011), 99 n. 150.
17 Colette R. Brunschwig, ‘Multisensory Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence:  How 
Family  Mediators  Can  Better  Communicate  with  Their  Clients,’ Phoenix  Law 
Review, Vol. 5, No. 4 (2012), 744, 705-746.
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12.1.2.2. Law as image: ocularocentrism in the legal context
Given the advent of visual digital media and its implications for the law, 
some legal scholars, however, suggest that a visual turn is also occurring in 
the legal context.18 SHERWIN perceives a ‘cultural shift from the rule of 
the written or spoken word to that of the visual or digital  image.’ This 
shift, he argues, ‘compels us to view the pursuit of truth and justice in our 
time from a radically different perspective than the one we inherited from 
the European Enlightenment.’19 Elsewhere, SHERWIN notes ‘that law has 
migrated to the screen, both in court and out’,20 and that ‘[l]aw, too, is 
going visual’.21 He further  observes ‘the visual  life of  law’,22 that law ‘is 
lived cinematically’,23 that ‘law lives like an image’,24 and that ‘law lives the 
life of images on the screen’.25 FEIGENSON & SPIESEL also mention 
that the law ‘has gone visual’.26
Similarly, BOEHME-NESSLER, a German legal scholar, contemplates 
the growing importance of images in the modern world. Images, he claims, 
‘are  in  the  process  of  taking  over  from  books  as  the  main  cultural 
medium’. Crucially, for our purposes here, ‘the law cannot exempt itself 
from this development. In recent times the signs are growing ever stronger 
that the importance of images in the law is gradually increasing.’27
Such  ocularocentric  views  may be partly  true,  considering  the  many 
visual legal phenomena currently emerging: legal norm images,28 legal visu-
18 Sherwin, Visualizing Law in the Age of the Digital Baroque, 11. See also Feigenson 
& Spiesel, Law on Display, 13-17.
19 Sherwin, ‘Imagining Law as Film (Representation without Reference?)’ Law and the  
Humanities: An Introduction, eds. Austin Sarat, Matthew Anderson, & Catherine 
O. Frank (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 246, 241-268.
20 Id., ‘A Manifesto for Visual Legal Realism,’ 720.
21 Id., ‘A Manifesto for Visual Legal Realism,’ 727.
22 Id., Visualizing Law in the Age of the Digital Baroque, 5.
23 Id., ‘Imagining Law as a Film,’ 245.
24 Id., Visualizing Law in the Age of the Digital Baroque, 49.
25 Sherwin, ‘Constitutional Purgatory,’ 280.
26 Feigenson & Spiesel, Law on Display, 10.
27 Volker Boehme-Nessler, Pictorial Law: Modern Law and the Power of Pictures (Ber-
lin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2011), 115. See also id., Pictorial Law, 116-117.
28 See Colette R. Brunschwig, Visualisierung von Rechtsnormen:  Legal Design (Zurich: 
Schulthess Juristische Medien, 2001).
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alisations  in  court  judgments,29 legal  visualisations  for  educational  pur-
poses,30 legal visualisations in private legal practice (e.g., contract visualiza-
tions),31 visual evidence,32 and so forth.
12.1.2.3. Difficulties, a contradiction, and a research gap
Restricting or confining the law to the verbal and visual makes it difficult 
for  legal  discourse to adequately  explore multisensory digital  media and 
their impact on the law. Commenting on the relevant implications, FEI-
GENSON & SPIESEL argue that this shortcoming ‘poses a major obstacle 
to  understanding  what  is  happening  as  digitization  transforms  our 
world ...’33 That world, as we are aware, is being shaped increasingly by 
multimodal or multisensory digital media. As MEYERSON, chief innova-
tion officer at IBM, puts it: ‘A host of technologies are coming that will 
help us overcome our limitations and will transform the way we interact 
29 See id., ‘Legal Visualizations in Court Judgments: Reflections and Questions,’ avail-
able  at:  http://community.beck.de/gruppen/forum/visual-law/legal-visualizations- 
in-court-judgments-reflections-and-questions (last accessed on 4 February 2013).
30 See Raphaela Henze,  Bildmedien im juristischen Unterricht (Berlin: Tenea Verlag, 
2003); Eric Hilgendorf,  dtv-Atlas Recht, Vol. 1: Grundlagen, Staatsrecht, Strafrecht 
(Munich:  Deutscher  Taschenbuch  Verlag,  2003);  Thomas  Langer,  Die 
Verbildlichung  der  juristischen  Ausbildungsliteratur (Berlin:  Tenea  Verlag,  2004); 
Felix Herzog,  Strafrecht  illustrated:  30 Fälle aus  dem Strafrecht in Wort und Bild 
(Hamburg:  merus  verlag,  2007);  Erich  Hilgendorf,  dtv-Atlas  Recht,  Vol.  :  
Verwaltungsrecht, Zivilrecht (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2007); Klaus 
F.  Röhl  &  Stefan  Ulbrich,  Recht  anschaulich:  Visualisierung  in  der  Juristen-
ausbildung (Cologne: Halem, 2007), and Bernhard Bergmans,  Visualisierungen in  
Rechtslehre und Rechtswissenschaft: Ein Beitrag zur Rechtsvisualisierung (Berlin: Logos 
Verlag, 2009).
31 See, for instance, Helena Haapio et al.,  ‘Time for a Visual Turn in Contracting?’ 
Journal of Contract Management, Summer (2012), 49-57 (with further references).
32 See, for instance, Sam Gregory et al. (eds.), Video for Change: A Guide for Advocacy  
and Activism (London, Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2005); Feigenson & Spiesel, 
Law on Display; Gregory P. Joseph, Modern Visual Evidence (New York, NY: Law 
Journal Press, 2011); Sherwin,  Visualizing Law in the Age of the Digital Baroque; 
and Daniela Carpi, ‘Crime Evidence: “Simulacres et Simulations”, Photography as 
Forensic Evidence,’ Visualizing  Law and Authority:  Essays  on Legal  Aesthetics,  ed. 
Leif Dahlberg (Berlin, Boston, MA: De Gruyter, 2012), 253-265.
33 Feigenson  &  Spiesel,  Law  on  Display,  4.  Feigenson  &  Spiesel  refer  to  the 
transformation of the world ‘into one dominated by pictures’. Given the poignance 
of their phrase, I take the liberty of relating it to all sensory digital media.
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with machines and with each other.’34 Further, ‘one of the most intriguing 
aspects of this shift is our ability to give machines some of the capabilities 
of the right side of the human brain. New technologies make it possible for 
machines to mimic and augment the senses. Today, we see the beginnings 
of sensing machines in self-parking cars and biometric security—and the 
future is wide open.’35 In short,  these difficulties strongly contradict the 
growing significance of multimodal or multisensory digital media. Over-
emphasizing verbal and visual legal communication leads to marginalising 
or  even to  ignoring  other  modalities  of  existing  or  future  multisensory 
digital legal communication.
12.1.3. Questions
The subtitle of my paper—‘Toward Multisensory Law’—introduces a rel-
atively new term, which first needs to be clarified. The problems discussed 
above lead to further questions:
1. What are the impacts of multisensory digital media on the law? 
a. Is there already a trend toward the law as a multisensory phe-
nomenon, that is,  toward multisensory digital legal commu-
nication practices? If so, what does this trend look like? If not 
yet, what might such a trend look like?
b. How are  multisensory  digital  media  further  relevant  to  the 
law? Or how might they be further legally relevant? That is, 
do they or might such media have a further bearing on the 
law?
2. How could or rather should greater awareness be raised in legal 
discourse about the current and future relevance of multisensory 
digital media for the law? 
3. How could  or  rather  should  the marginalising  and ignoring  of 
multisensory digital legal communication practices be challenged? 
34 Bernard Meyerson, ‘The IBM Next 5 in 5: Our 2012 Forecast of Inventions that 
Will Change the World Within Five Years,’ Building a Smarter Planet: A Smarter 
Planet  Blog,  17  December  2012,  available  at:  http://asmarterplanet.com/blog/ 
2012/12/the-ibm-5-in-5-our-2012-forecast-of-inventions-that-will-change-the-
world-within-five-years.html (last accessed on 4 February 2013).
35 Meyerson, ‘The IBM Next 5 in 5,’ [s.p].
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4. How are these research questions relevant to legal discourse, par-
ticularly legal history, legal informatics, legal pedagogy, legal psy-
chology, and legal theory?
12.2. Multisensory law: a rough outline
What  follows  is  a  rough  outline  of  multisensory  law,  which  I  have 
explained in detail elsewhere.36
12.2.1. Multisensory law: the term
‘Understanding the term multisensory law requires clarifying the adjective 
multisensory, the noun  law, and how these terms are related.’37 The term 
law can be understood by drawing on legal  theory,  the doctrine of  the 
sources  of  law,  legal  informatics,  and popular  legal  culture.  Hence,  law 
‘encompasses the sources of law in a wide sense (including verbal sources 
of law in a strict sense, state legal practice in a strict sense, customary law, 
and jurisprudence—that  is,  legal  research and education),  legal  practice 
(comprising state legal practice in a wide sense and private legal practice), 
the contents of justice, legal and legally relevant facts, the contents of [high 
and; my insertion] popular legal culture, and further legally relevant con-
tents.’38
‘As  regards  the  adjective  multisensory,  the  psychology  of  perception, 
learning psychology, and the neurosciences distinguish between stimuli and 
their  perception.  Thus,  multisensory  implies  that  human  beings  are 
affected by two or more different external or internal stimuli. These stim-
uli are different because they address various human sensory systems, such 
36 See Colette R. Brunschwig, ‘Multisensory Law and Legal Informatics—A Compar-
ison  of  How  these  Legal  Disciplines  Relate  to  Visual  Law’, Structuring  Legal  
Semantics: Festschrift for Erich Schweighofer, eds. Anton Geist et al. (Bern: Editions 
Weblaw,  2011),  581-617,  573-667,  also  available  at:  http://jusletter-
eu.weblaw.ch/service/login.html?targetPage=http%3A%2F%2Fjusletter-eu.weblaw. 
ch%2FmagnoliaPublic%2Fjusletter-it%2Fissues%2F2011%2F104%2Farticle_324 
.html (last accessed on 4 February 2013); see also my paper on ‘Multisensory Law 
and Therapeutic Jurisprudence’, 713-714.
37 Id., ‘Multisensory Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence’, 713.
38 Ibid.
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as the visual sensory system, the auditory sensory system, or indeed both, 
and so forth. Moreover, these stimuli coincide in space and time. Regard-
ing the effect of these stimuli on human perception, two or more percept-
ive systems are constantly and simultaneously active.’39
Further, the terms ‘multisensory’ and ‘law’ are related thus: ‘The adject-
ive multisensory modifies the noun law. Multisensory tells us what kind of 
law is  at stake—namely, a law that is  multi-sensory with all  its implica-
tions.’40
12.2.2. Subject matter and cognitive interest of 
multisensory law
12.2.2.1. Multisensory law: subject matter
‘What is the subject matter of multisensory law? Put simply, this emerging 
legal discipline’41 explores ‘the sensory phenomena of the law’,42 be they 
unisensory (i.e., visual, auditory, kinaesthetic, and so forth) or multisens-
39 Brunschwig, ‘Multisensory Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence’, 713.
40 Id., ‘Multisensory Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence’, 714.
41 Brunschwig, ‘Multisensory Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence’, 714.
42 Ibid.
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ory (i.e., audiovisual, tactile-kinaesthetic, visual-kinaesthetic, and so forth). 
Multisensory law focuses primarily on the law as a uni- and multisensory 
phenomenon within and outside the legal context. It deals only marginally 
with the uni- and multisensory phenomena in the legal sources in a strict 
sense, because they are explored chiefly by the established legal disciplines 
of applicable law.
12.2.2.1.1. Uni- and multisensory phenomena in the legal sources in a 
strict sense
Generally, the established disciplines of the applicable law and the basic 
legal  disciplines  explore  the unisensory  and multisensory  phenomena in 
the legal sources in a strict  sense. Multisensory law as such does not pre-
sume to compete with these legal disciplines, but seeks to draw their atten-
tion  to  questions  otherwise  neglected,  discussed  inadequately,  or  which 
might  benefit  from  additional  insights.  In  so  doing,  multisensory  law 
adopts questions and insights from non-legal disciplines dealing specific-
ally  with  sensory  phenomena.  Thus,  multisensory  law  might  provide  a 
deeper and a broader view, perhaps even a meta-perspective, on the sensory 
phenomena of  the law.  I  illustrate  multisensory  law’s  ancillary  function 
below (6.3.1.2).
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12.2.2.1.2. Law as a uni- and multisensory phenomenon in the legal 
context
The law appears as a unisensory and multisensory phenomenon in the legal 
context. As shown (Figure 12.1), ‘[i]ts foundations include sources of law 
in a wide sense, legal practice, justice-related contents, and legal or legally 
relevant facts. These foundations are part of the law as a uni- and multis-
ensory phenomenon’43 in the legal context. I exemplify the law as a multis-
ensory phenomenon in the legal context below (3).
12.2.2.1.3. Law as a uni- and multisensory phenomenon outside the 
legal context
Law as a unisensory and multisensory phenomenon outside the legal con-
text. refers to the contents of high and popular legal culture and to further 
legally relevant contents. For FRIEDMAN, legal culture is ‘nothing more 
than the “ideas, attitudes, values, and opinions about law held by people in 
a society”. … Legal culture refers to those ideas and attitudes which are 
specifically  legal  in  content—ideas  about  courts,  justice,  the police,  the 
Supreme Court, lawyers, and so on.’44
What does ‘high legal culture’ mean? It refers to works of art. The art-
and-law movement studies these phenomena as well: ‘The power of spir-
itual, edifying icons is celebrated in every courtroom: in the wigs, robes, 
and other theatrical paraphernalia of legal performance and in the images 
of justice that adorn our public buildings.’45 DOUZINAS & NEAD argue 
that  ‘[t]he  relationship  between  law  and  art  can  be  analytically  distin-
guished into two components: law’s art, the ways in which political and 
legal systems have shaped, used, and regulated images and art,  and art’s 
law,  the representation of law,  justice,  and other  legal  themes in art … 
Cesare Ripa’s  Iconologia, published in 1593, proposes a number of legal 
images, including justice and injustice.’46
43 Brunschwig, ‘Multisensory Law and Legal Informatics.’ 593.
44 Lawrence M. Friedman, ‘Law, Lawyers, and Popular Culture,’ Popular Culture and 
Law, ed. Richard K. Sherwin (Hants, Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), 3, 3-30.
45 Costas Douzinas & Lynda Nead, ‘Introduction,’ Law and the Image, eds. Costas 
Douzinas and Lynda Nead (Chicago, IL, London: The University of Chicago Press, 
1999), 9, 1-15.
46 Douzinas & Nead, ‘Introduction,’ 11.
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Writing  on  popular culture,  FRIEDMAN states  that  the term ‘refers 
first, and more generally to the norms and values held by ordinary people, 
or at any rate, by non-intellectuals, as opposed to high culture, the culture 
of intellectuals  and the intelligentsia,  or what Robert Gordon has called 
‘mandarin culture’. Second, and more narrowly, it refers to ‘culture’ in the 
sense of books,  songs,  movies,  plays,  television shows, and the like;  but 
specifically to those works of imagination whose intended audience is the 
public as a whole, rather than the intelligentsia: Elvis rather than Marilyn 
Horne.’47
Drawing on FRIEDMAN, ASIMOW & MADER outline two semantic 
aspects of ‘popular legal culture’. The first, they argue, ‘refers to the entire 
universe of knowledge, behaviors, beliefs, and attitudes that circulate in a 
particular society or subgroup of that society … popular legal culture refers 
to everything people know or think they know about law, lawyers, and the 
legal system.’48 The second, in their view, ‘includes commercial texts (such 
as movies, TV shows, or novels) about law, lawyers, or the legal system.’49
Hence,  the  second  meaning  of  ‘popular  legal  culture’  means  the 
products of the visual and audio-visual mass media, including motion pic-
tures50 and television films,51 which show legal and legally relevant contents 
to  a  broad audience.52 Other  forms  include either  real  or  fictional  trial 
movies53 and court TV—the latter in a real54 or fictional55 version.
47 Friedman, ‘Law, Lawyers, and Popular Culture,’ 3.
48 Michael Asimow & Shannon Mader, Law and Popular Culture: A Coursebook (New 
York, NY, et al.: Peter Lang, 2007), 4.
49 Id., Law and Popular Culture, 4.
50 See Michael Asimow, ‘Popular Culture Matters,’ Lawyers in Your Living Room! Law 
on Television, ed. Michael Asimow (Chicago, IL: ABA Publishing, 2009), xix-xxvi, 
and Elayne Rapping, ‘Introduction: The History of Law on Television,’ Lawyers in  
Your Living Room! Law on Television, ed. Michael Asimow (Chicago, IL: ABA Pub-
lishing, 2009), xxvii-xxxv. 
51 See  Asimow,  ‘Popular  Culture  Matters,’ xix-xxvi,  and Rapping,  ‘Introduction’, 
xxvii-xxxv.
52 See William P. MacNeil,  Lex Populi:  The Jurisprudence of Popular Culture (Stan-
ford,  CA: Stanford University  Press,  2007),  1 and  passim;  Richard K.  Sherwin, 
When  Law  Goes  Pop:  The  Vanishing  Line  between  Law  and  Popular  Culture 
(Chicago, IL, London: The University of Chicago Press, 2002), 3 sqq., 15 sqq., and 
141 sqq., and Steve Greenfield, Guy Osborn & Peter Robson, Film and the Law: 
The Cinema of Justice, 2nd ed. (Oxford, Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2010), 16.
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Further legally relevant contents ‘comprise the remaining legally relevant 
contents which cannot be subsumed under the categories of ‘law’ hitherto 
enumerated.’56 One example  are  legal  visualisations  including  psycholo-
gical  contents.  In  a  book  on  couples  therapy,  BODENMANN  ‘has 
developed a verbo-visual model based on stress theory to explain the pos-
sible causes of divorce.’57 Such a legal visualisation could be used in family 
mediation  or  in  divorce  law  lawyering  ‘to  explain  which  factors  have 
potentially contributed to the existing conflict and therefore to the possibly 
imminent divorce.’58 When such a legal visualisation is applied in the legal 
context, one could also classify it as a visual phenomenon in the legal con-
text. Thus, whereas the three spheres of multisensory law are interrelated, 
delimiting them sometimes proves difficult or near-to impossible.
12.2.2.2. Multisensory law: cognitive interest
The cognitive interest of multisensory law can be formulated in terms of 
various key questions.59 BENTLY, for instance, asks: ‘How does law sense? 
What does law understand to be the nature of our senses? How does law 
constitute our notions of the senses? How does law control or regulate our 
senses? How does law use our senses? Which senses does law use?’60
53 See  Paul  Bergman & Michael  Asimow,  Reel  Justice:  The  Courtroom Goes  to the  
Movies (Missouri,  MO:  Andrews  and  McMeel,  1996),  1  sqq.,  and  Greenfield, 
Osborn, & Robson, Film and the Law, 52 sqq.
54 On real  court  TV,  see  http://www.trutv.com/newname.html  (last  accessed  on 4 
February 2013).
55 On fictional court TV, see Taunya Lovell  Banks,  ‘Judging the Judges—Daytime 
Television’s Integrated Reality Court Bench,’ Lawyers in Your Living Room! Law on 
Television,  ed.  Michael  Asimow (Chicago, IL: ABA Publishing, 2009),  309-320, 
and Stefan Machura, ‘German Judge Shows: Migrating from the Courtroom tot he 
TV Studio,’ Lawyers in Your Living Room! Law on Television, ed. Michael Asimow 
(Chicago, IL: ABA Publishing, 2009), 321-332.
56 Brunschwig, ‘Multisensory Law and Legal Informatics,’ 591.
57 Id., ‘Multisensory Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence,’ 718. See Guy Bodenmann, 
Verhaltenstherapie mit Paaren: Ein modernes Handbuch für die psychologische Bera-
tung und Behandlung (Bern et al.: Verlag Hans Huber, 2004), 36, fig. 9.
58 Brunschwig, ‘Multisensory Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence,’ 718.
59 Id., ‘Multisensory Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence,’ 714.
60 Lionel  Bently,  ‘Introduction,’ Law and the Senses:  Sensational Jurisprudence,  eds. 
Lionel Bently & Leo Flynn (London, Chicago, IL: Pluto Press, 1996), 2, 1-17.
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12.2.2.2.1. Uni- and multisensory phenomena in the legal sources in a 
strict sense: cognitive interest
Several  of  BENTLY’s  questions—What  does  law  understand  to  be  the 
nature of our senses? How does law constitute our notions of the senses? 
How  does  law  control  or  regulate  our  senses?—concern  the  cognitive 
interest regarding the unisensory and multisensory phenomena in the legal 
sources in a strict sense. Here are some further key questions: Which senses 
does law not control or regulate? Why, to what end, and with which effect 
does law (not) control or regulate our senses?
12.2.2.2.2. Law as a uni- and multisensory phenomenon in the legal 
context: cognitive interest
Again, several of BENTLY’s questions—How does law sense? How does 
law use our senses? Which senses does law use?—can be related to the law 
as a unisensory and multisensory phenomenon within the legal context.
For instance, how does traffic law—as a source of law in the strict sense
—sense? Does traffic law sense visually? How do the verbal sources of law 
in a strict sense—for instance, patent law—use our visual sense? How does 
patent law use sight? Considering such questions,  BOEHME-NESSLER 
points to the ‘shadowy existence’61 of images in modern law. ‘Legal texts—
whether laws, judgements or learned documents—on the whole contain no 
images or graphics. Text-books without images are almost symbolic of the 
subject of law. Although even here—as in all things in life—the exceptions 
prove the rule. The Highway Code with its images of traffic signs and sig-
nals is the most obvious example. And in the fields of invention, patent 
and brand ownership, law images are not just normal, they are indispens-
able.’62 Given  today’s  visual  and audio-visual  (legal)  culture,  other  laws 
could be presented as visual or audio-visual phenomena in the future. How 
does legal practice in a strict sense (court decisions and decisions of admin-
istrative bodies) use our visual sense? One use of sight, as mentioned, are 
legal visualisations in court judgments. Such visualisations could be sub-
sumed under court decisions as visual phenomena or rather as verbo-visual 
phenomena.63 Likewise, how does jurisprudence, particularly legal educa-
61 Boehme-Nessler, Pictorial Law, 105.
62 Ibid.
63 Brunschwig, ‘Legal Visualizations in Court Judgments’, [s.p.].
245
CHAPTER 12. LAW IS NOT OR MUST NOT BE JUST VERBAL AND VISUAL IN THE 21ST CENTURY: 
tion, use sight and hearing? Legal education films for law students belong 
to legal education as an audio-visual phenomenon.64
12.2.2.2.3. Law as a uni- and multisensory phenomenon outside the 
legal context: cognitive interest
Adapting  BENTLY’s  questions  to  the  extralegal  context,  how does  law 
sense outside the legal context? What does the extra-legal context consider 
to be the nature of law’s senses? How does the extralegal context use law’s 
senses or rather how does it represent the law as a unisensory and multis-
ensory phenomenon?65 As this context is not important in this paper, I dis-
pense with illustrating these questions with concrete examples.
12.3. Law as a multisensory phenomenon in the 
legal context: trend toward multisensory digital 
legal communication practices
How do multisensory digital media impact the law? Is there already a trend 
toward the law as a multisensory phenomenon, that is, toward multisens-
ory digital legal communication practices? If so, what does this trend look 
like? If not yet, what might such a trend look like?
12.3.1. Virtual reality (VR) in the legal context
12.3.1.1. Virtual reality: a rough outline
Definitions of VRs abound. FURHT, for instance, describes VR as ‘… the 
technology that provides almost real and/or believable experiences in a syn-
thetic or virtual way.’66 To provide such experiences, ‘virtual reality uses 
the  entire  spectrum of  current  multimedia  technologies  such  as  image, 
video, sound and text, as well as newer and upcoming media such as e-
64 Colette  R.  Brunschwig,  ‘Legal  Education Films  for  Law Students’,  available  at: 
http://community.beck.de/gruppen/forum/audio-visual-law/legal-educa-
tion-films-for-law-students (last accessed on 4 February 2013). These few examples 
must suffice here. For an in-depth discussion, see my ‘Multisensory Law and Legal 
Informatics,’ esp. 603-606. See also section 3 below.
65 See Brunschwig, ‘Multisensory Law and Legal Informatics,’ 607.
66 Borko Furht, ‘Virtual Reality,’ Encyclopedia of Multimedia A-Z, ed. Borko Furht, 
2nd ed. (New York, NY: Springer, 2008), 968.
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touch, e-taste, and e-smell. To define the characteristics of VR, Heim … 
used the three “I”s, immersion, interactivity and information intensity.’67
There is no space to further describe virtual realities in terms of hard- 
and software (media-related aspects)68 or in a semiotic sense (code-related 
aspects). Whereas these aspects are also essential in relation to multisensory 
law, let us consider the sensory implications of virtual reality.  STEUER 
writes that 
‘The key to defining virtual reality in terms of human experience rather 
than technological  hardware is the concept of presence.  Presence can be 
thought of as the experience of one’s physical environment; it refers not to 
one’s surroundings as they exist in the physical world, but to the percep-
tion of those surroundings as mediated by both automatic and controlled 
mental processes … Presence is defined as the sense of being in an environ-
ment. Many perceptual factors help to generate this sense, including input 
from some or all sensory channels, as well as more mindful, attentional, 
perceptual,  and other  mental  processes  that assimilate  incoming sensory 
data with current concerns and past experiences …’69 
Reflecting  on  the  connection  between  presence  and  perception, 
STEUER remarks that ‘when perception is mediated by a communication 
technology, one is forced to perceive two separate environments simultan-
eously: the physical environment in which one is actually present and the 
environment presented via the medium. The term telepresence can be used 
to describe the precedence of the latter experience in favour of the former; 
that is, telepresence is the extent to which one feels present in the mediated 
environment, rather than in the immediate physical environment.’70
On the vividness of virtual realities, a much-discussed topic, STEUER 
points  out  that  this  depends  on  sensory  breadth  and  depth.71 Sensory 
67 Ibid. On virtual reality, see also Alistair Sutcliffe,  Multimedia and Virtual Reality: 
Designing Multisensory User Interfaces (Mahwah, NJ, London: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, Publishers, 2003), 9-23.
68 See  instead  Kay  M.  Stanney  &  Joseph  v  Cohn,  ‘Virtual  Environments,’ The  
Human-Computer Interaction Handbook: Fundamentals, Evolving Technologies, and  
Emerging  Applications,  ed.  Julie A. Jacko (Boca Raton, London, New York, NY: 
CRC Press, 2012), 644-650, 643-667.
69 Jonathan  Steuer,  ‘Defining  Virtual  Reality:  Dimensions  Determining 
Telepresence,’ Journal of Communication, Vol. 42, No. 4 (1992), 75, 73-93.
70 Steuer, ‘Defining Virtual Reality’, 75-76.
71 See id., ‘Defining Virtual Reality’, 81.
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breadth  ‘refers  to  the  number  of  sensory  dimensions  simultaneously 
presented’,72 whereas sensory depth concerns ‘the resolution within each of 
these perceptual channels’.73
Virtual reality,  therefore,  applies  to computer-simulated,  three-dimen-
sional environments. These surroundings are capable of simulating indoor 
and outdoor spaces in the real world or in imagined worlds with all their 
uni- and multisensory implications.
Legal  discourse  has  started exploring virtual  reality.  FEIGENSON & 
SPIESEL draw our  attention  to  three  types  of  virtual  reality.  The  first 
‘refers  to  completely  computer-generated  pictures,  offering  a  greater  or 
lesser  illusion  of  three-dimensionality.  This  category  includes  still  and 
moving pictures,  as well  as dynamic environments that can be explored 
interactively (video games are an example).’74 The second type is  augmen-
ted virtuality, where ‘virtual pictures are augmented by data drawn from 
the real world (photographs, for instance)’.75 The third is an ‘immersive 
virtual environment’, where ‘people put on equipment, typically some sort 
of headpiece and gloves with sensing devices, in order to enter and interact 
in a three-dimensional simulation of an environment.’76
LEONETTI & BAILENSON describe immersive virtual reality (IVE) 
as ‘an artificial,  interactive,  computer-generated scene or “world” within 
which a user can immerse herself.’  Considering its sensory implications, 
they argue that ‘IVEs combine high-resolution, stereoscopic projection and 
three-dimensional computer graphics to create a complete sense of pres-
ence in a virtual environment. IVEs consist of immersion in an artificial 
environment in which the users feel just as perceptually surrounded as they 
do in  “reality”.  IVEs  produce  a  simulated  yet  interactive  reality  in  real 
time, which can support spatialized sound and virtual touch … Common 
examples of IVEs are certain computer games, training programs such as 
flight and driving simulators,  and immersive and interactive art installa-
tions.’77
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Feigenson & Spiesel, Law on Display, 164.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Carrie Leonetti & Jeremy Bailenson, ‘High-Tech View: The Use of Immersive Vir-
tual Environments in Jury Trials’, Marquette Law Rev., Vol. 93 (2010), 1075-1076, 
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Importantly, IVEs are capable of multisensorily recreating the facts of a 
case:  ‘IVEs are,  in a sense,  expert  environments.  The IVE is  not  just  a 
snapshot of the scene [e.g., a crime scene, scene of an accident; my inser-
tion],  but  rather  a  computer  model  created  to  represent  the  scene.  An 
expert witness is needed to explain to the inexpert jury the array of sophist-
icated methodological and interpretative techniques and assumptions that 
were involved in the creation of the IVE.’78
12.3.1.2. Virtual reality as multisensory evidence
12.3.1.2.1. Augmented virtual reality as multisensory evidence
The second Bloody Sunday Trial serves as a case in point for using multis-
ensory evidence in court. In this trial ‘[a]ugmented virtuality was used’.79 
The facts of the case: ‘On Sunday, the 30th January 1972, thirteen people 
1073-1120.
78 Id., ‘High-Tech View,’ 1100.
79 Feigenson & Spiesel,  Law on Display, 166. See also Neal Feigenson & Christina 
Spiesel, ‘The Juror and Courtroom of the Future,’ The Future of Evidence: How Sci-
ence & Technology Will Change the Practice of Law, eds. Carol Henderson & Jules 
Epstein (Chicago, IL: American Bar Association, 2011), 115-116, 113-136.
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were killed by British soldiers on the streets of Derry. The circumstances in 
which they died have been the subject of enormous on [sic] ongoing con-
troversy.’80 There were two trials on the events that occurred on that day. 
Prior  to  the  second  trial,  ‘an  interactive  virtual  reality  system  was 
developed specifically for use by the Bloody Sunday Tribunal in order to 
aid the orientation of witnesses when they gave their evidence.’81 This real-
ity ‘consisted of thousands of photographs and computer-generated images 
of Derry, both present day and as it was in 1972. A combination of this 
application  and  touchscreen  technology  used  in  the  hearing  chamber 
allowed users to virtually walk the streets of Derry.  Once a witness was 
viewing a particular  “hotspot”,  he or  she could view the scene from all 
angles. Witnesses could also draw arrows on the screen to record move-
ments or events which they saw.’82
WHELAN comments on the positive effects of such multisensory evid-
ence:
‘The idea of bringing all of that information together into a virtual reality 
reconstruction (and including new images where necessary) proved to be of 
great assistance to the lawyers and witnesses trying to make sense of the 
complex events which occurred decades previously. Continuous reference 
was made to the photographs and maps, as well as the virtual reality recre-
ation of 1972 Derry,  especially  as  some buildings had been demolished 
since 1972.’83 He suggests that the VR system ‘made it possible to pose 
questions and to test witnesses’  memories in a way that would not have 
been possible with photographs and maps.’84
Thus, virtual reality can or could be used as multisensory evidence in 
criminal trials ‘to re-create crime scenes, impeach the testimony of an unre-
liable witness, test assertions, and enhance a jury’s understanding of dis-
puted events.’85 Which scene(s) could be virtually recreated? According to 
80 Darius Whelan, ‘The Bloody Sunday Tribunal Video Simulation,’ Visual Practices  
Across the Universities, ed. James Elkis (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2007), 101, 
100-103.
81 Whelan, ‘The Bloody Sunday Tribunal Video Simulation,’ 101.
82 Ibid.
83 Id., ‘The Bloody Sunday Tribunal Video Simulation,’ 102.
84 Id., ‘The Bloody Sunday Tribunal Video Simulation,’ 103.
85 Leonetti & Bailenson, ‘High-Tech View,’ 1076.
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LEONETTI & BAILENSON, virtual reality involves ‘the configuration 
of streets, driveways, buildings), episodes or events (appearances, sizes, and 
shapes),  and  abstract  factual  material  (trends,  relationships)  as  visual 
images rather than as strings of spoken or written text.’86 A multisensory 
virtual reality, moreover, ‘would permit a sufficiently, if not more, accurate 
view of the crime scene and its pertinent details (the position of the body, 
the location where the weapon was discovered, the fatal wounds) without 
the blood and guts of video and still photographs.’87
12.3.1.2.2. Immersive virtual reality as multisensory evidence
As  observed  (3.1.1),  immersive  virtual  reality  can  or  could  be  used  as 
multisensory  evidence  in  criminal  trials.  LEONETTI  & BAILENSON 
suggest a further application of immersive virtual realities in criminal trials:
‘Second, the use of an IVE representing the events in question, created by a 
VR expert after consultation with the defense team or review of pretrial 
discovery  materials  might provide a vehicle  for  a criminal  defendant to 
introduce evidence of her version of events before the jury and permit the 
jury to test that version without the defendant having to waive her Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. For example, imagine a 
murder  prosecution  where  the  defense  is  mistaken  self-defense.  The 
defendant is claiming that she shot someone in an alley that she believed 
was attacking her, when in fact the person was in the alley for innocent 
reasons unrelated to the defendant. The primary issue at trial is the reason-
ableness of the defendant’s mistaken belief … With an IVE, a VR expert 
could generate an IVE, taking into account all parties’ versions of events, 
permitting the jury to see the alley through the defendant’s eyes without 
the inherent risks entailed with the waiver of her Fifth Amendment priv-
ilege through live testimony.’88
Also  from a  legal  perspective,  FEIGENSON & SPIESEL  claim that 
‘[o]ne can readily imagine legal uses for IVEs [= immersive virtual realities; 
my insertion].’ One use, for instance, would be ‘to provide a “virtual jury 
view”, a good way for jurors to “visit” a crime or accident scene without 
leaving the courtroom.’ Citing the legal scholar Frederic Lederer, they fur-
86 Id., ‘High-Tech View,’ 1077.
87 Id., ‘High-Tech View,’ 1116.
88 Id., ‘High-Tech View,’ 1116-1117.
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ther observe that an IVE could be used ‘to determine what a witness could 
have seen in an operating room in a hypothetical  torts  case involving a 
medical device malfunction. The witness was able to move around the vir-
tual operating room while observers in the courtroom could see on a large 
screen what the witness was seeing.’89
12.3.1.3. Multisensory virtual reality for people with 
disabilities
Multisensory virtual  realities are increasingly being developed for people 
with disabilities.90 There are ‘applications in the fields of spatial learning, 
special education and physical rehabilitation.’91 The field of spatial learn-
ing concerns blind people in particular. Emphasisng the benefit of multis-
ensory virtual realities for the blind, LAHAV & MIODUSER write that:
‘The  ability  to navigate  space  independently,  safely  and efficiently  is  a 
combined product of motor, sensory and cognitive skills. This ability has 
direct  influence  in  the  individuals’  quality  of  life.  Mental  mapping  of 
spaces,  and of the possible paths for navigating through these spaces,  is 
essential for the development of efficient orientation and mobility skills. 
Most of the information required for this mental mapping is visual inform-
ation … Blind people lack this crucial information, thus facing great diffi-
culties (a) in generating efficient mental maps of spaces, and therefore (b) 
in navigating efficiently within these spaces.’92
Moreover, the deficit ‘in the visual channel should be compensated with 
information  perceived  via  other  senses,  e.g.,  touch and hearing.’93 Cru-
cially, multisensory virtual realities support blind people in the ‘acquisition 
of orientation and mobility skills, by compensating the deficiencies of the 
89 Feigenson & Spiesel, Law on Display, 167.
90 See Paul N. Wilson, Nigel Foreman, & Danaë Stanton, ‘Virtual reality, disability, 
and rehabilitation,’ Disability and Rehabilitation, Vol. 19, No. 6 (1997), 214, 213-
220.
91 Ibid.
92 Orly Lahav & David Mioduser, ‘Multisensory Virtual Environment for Supporting 
Blind Persons’ Acquisition of Spatial Cognitive Mapping—a Case Study,’ Research 
Report No. 69, [s.l.] [s.t.], 1, 1-6, available at: http://muse.tau.ac.il/publications/ 
larticle.html (last accessed on 4 February 2013).
93 Ibid.
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impaired channel.’94 Multisensory virtual realities enable ‘blind people to 
learn about different (real  life)  spaces  that they are required to navigate 
(e.g., shool, work, place, public buildings).’95 And such realities ‘provide 
the opportunitiy to practise real-world tasks free from real hazards.’96
12.3.1.4. Multisensory virtual reality for blind legal actors
Based on LAHAV & MIODUSER, I would suggest the use of multisens-
ory virtual realities for blind legal actors, such as law professors, law stu-
dents, lawyers, judges, policemen, public officials, members of parliament, 
prosecutors, persons involved in legal conflicts or in other public or private 
legal matters, and so forth. Thus, such legal actors would be empowered to 
learn more about their various workplaces, for instance, their university, 
department,  libraries,  and  so  forth.  Such  multisensory  virtual  realities 
might also be offered to blind members of other faculties.  Multisensory 
virtual realities would assist practicing lawyers, judges, policemen, public 
officials, members of parliament, prosecutors, and persons involved in legal 
conflicts  or  in  other  public  or  private  legal  matters  in  better  orienting 
themselves in courts, agencies, legislative bodies, prisons, and other profes-
sional surroundings.
12.3.2. Brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) in the legal 
context
12.3.2.1. Brain-computer interfaces: a rough outline
PANTKE describes  a  brain-computer  interface  as  ‘a  special  human-ma-
chine interface that connects the brain with a computer without the use of 
limbs or any motor activity.’97 He further observes that ‘with the help of a 
94 Id., ‘Multisensory Virtual Environment for Supporting Blind Persons,’ 2.
95 Id., ‘Multisensory Virtual Environment for Supporting Blind Persons,’ 2.
96 Wilson, Foreman, & Stanton, ‘Virtual reality, disability, and rehabilitation,’ 215.
97 Karl-Heinz  Pantke,  ‘Was  sind  hämodynamische  und  elektrophysiologische 
Systeme?  Was  sind  Elektroenzephalographie  (EEG),  Magnetenzephalographie 
(MEG),  funktionelle  Magnet-Resonanz-Tomographie  (fMRT)  und  funktionelle 
Nah-Infrarot-Spektroskopie  (fNIRS)?  Was  sind  Paradigmen  für  Brain-Com-
puter-Interfaces?’ Mensch und Maschine, Wie Brain-Computer-Interfaces und andere  
Innovationen  gelähmten  Menschen  kommunizieren  helfen,  ed.  Karl-Heinz  Pantke 
(Frankfurt am Main: Mabuse-Verlag, 2010), 9, 9-19. N.B. This passage and those 
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brain computer interface, entirely paralyzed persons are able to work with 
a  computer’.98 This  concerns  human-machine  communication  and  the 
information in the brain is ‘coded as bioelectrical impulses’.99 Machine-hu-
man communication in BCI cases ‘takes place via the sensory systems of 
the human body, that is, through optical and acoustic stimuli made avail-
able via screens or loudspeakers.’100
Recently, BCIs have been developing from visually- to multisensorily-ori-
ented systems. Reflecting on the rapid development of BCIs over the past 
decade, WAGNER, DALY, & VÄLJAMÄE observe that 
‘most of these interfaces rely on the visual modality for providing users 
with control and feedback signals. Only a few research groups have been 
studying  non-visual  BCIs,  primarily  based  on  auditory  and,  rarely,  on 
somatosensory  signals.  For  severely  disabled  patients  with  poor  vision, 
non-visual BCI approaches may be the only option … Gradually decreas-
ing, or even complete loss of eye-movement control prevents the use of 
common BCI technologies that rely on visual displays and spatial vision … 
Similarly,  many  potential  BCI  users  can  have  cortical  or  subcortical 
lesions, which may lead to neuropsychological conditions such as hemineg-
lect or agnosia that make it difficult or even impossible to focus attention 
on visual stimuli.  For non-visually  impaired BCI users,  there are strong 
neurophysiological reasons to use multisensory BCIs [my emphasis].’101
According to PANTKE, BCI systems can neither visualise nor uncover 
thoughts.102 Despite this qualification, WALTER asks ‘why is it so obvious 
to talk about reading thoughts?’ In response, he argues that:
‘Because in certain contexts it is relatively simple to interpret brain signals. 
For instance, in the area of sensomotor function it is possible to locate the 
regions with the help of fMRT. They code touch and movement and are 
relatively firmly ‘wired.’  Even if persons merely imagine to move some-
thing, typical signal changes become apparent in these regions. The latter 
are  so  reliable  that  through  skilfully  connecting  EEG  and  peripheral 
cited below have been translated from the German.
98 Id., ‘Was sind hämodynamische und elektrophysiologische Systeme?’ 9.
99 Id., ‘Was sind hämodynamische und elektrophysiologische Systeme?’ 10.
100 Ibid.
101 Wagner,  Daly,  & Väljamäe,  ‘Non-visual  and  Multisensory  BCI  Systems,’ 375. 
Similarly see id., ‘Non-visual and Multisensory BCI Systems,’ 388.
102 See Pantke, ‘Was sind hämodynamische und elektrophysiologische Systeme?’ 11.
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devices, experimental subjects using their thoughts (that is, by imagining 
movement) can handle a typewriter, play flipper or operate prostheses (to 
some extent).  Furthermore,  within specialised regions of  the brain con-
cerned with processing movement, colour, faces, body parts, or houses, it is 
possible to distinguish whether an experimental subject directs her or his 
attention to houses or faces offered simultaneously, of if she or he is think-
ing of one of the two objects …’103
Moreover, ‘one can argue about whether one calls this reading thoughts
—one might rather call it ‘reading brain signals.’ But at least it is possible 
to reliably discern from the brain signals whether someone is thinking of a 
house, a face, a body part, or of movement, provided that the experiment 
is well designed.’104
WAGNER, DALY, & VÄlJAMÄE also suggest that BCIs are capable of 
encoding thoughts: ‘Several strategies for BCI control involve a different 
type of mental activity—kinaesthetic or visual imagination of movement, 
auditory imagination of music, and speech. Some of these tasks are non-
visual,  and some have  been used  in  combination  with  non-visual  feed-
back.’105 Discussing speech-oriented BCIs, they observe that ‘An idea for 
improving the intuitiveness of BCI operation is to base control upon the 
imagination of speech. In such a paradigm the user would simply be asked 
to imagine speaking a control  command in order  to enact  control.  For 
example, to operate a wheel chair to go left they might imagine speaking 
the word ‘left.’ More interestingly, such a paradigm could theoretically be 
used to make a highly intuitive and fast BCI speller.’106
103 Henrik  Walter,  ‘Was  können  wir  messen?  Neuroimaging—eine  Einführung  in 
methodische Grundlagen, häufige Fehlschlüsse und ihre mögliche Bedeutung für 
Strafrecht und Menschenbild’,  Von der Neuroethik zum Neurorecht? eds. Stephan 
Schleim, Tade Matthias Spranger, & Henrik Walter (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 2010), 77, 67-103. N.B. This passage and those cited below have been 
translated from the German.
104 Id., ‘Was können wir messen?’ 77-78.
105 Wagner, Daly, & Väljamäe, ‘Non-visual and Multisensory BCI Systems,’ 382.
106 Id., ‘Non-visual and Multisensory BCI Systems,’ 384.
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12.3.2.2. Multisensory brain-computer interfaces and legal 
actors with aphasia
12.3.2.2.1. On aphasia
The website of the National Aphasia Association (US) includes a page where 
FAQs about  aphasia  are  answered  in a  generally  intelligible  way.  Thus, 
‘Aphasia is an acquired communication disorder that impairs a person’s abil-
ity to process language, but does not affect intelligence. Aphasia impairs the 
ability  to  speak  and  understand  others,  and  most  people  with  aphasia 
experience  difficulty  reading  and  writing.’107 Persons  unable  to  speak 
and/or  write  suffer  from  expressive  aphasia.  Those unable to understand 
spoken and/or written language suffer from receptive aphasia. This kind of 
language disorder can also involve both types of aphasia.108 What are the 
causes of aphasia? ‘The most common cause of aphasia is stroke … It can 
also result from head injury, brain tumor or other neurological causes.’109
As a rule, neither expressive nor receptive aphasia affects a person’s intel-
ligence:  ‘A person with  aphasia  may have  difficulty  retrieving  words  and  
names,  but  the  person’s  intelligence  is  basically  intact.  Aphasia  is  not  like 
Alzheimer’s disease; for people with aphasia  it is the ability to access ideas  
and thoughts through language—not the ideas and thoughts themselves—that  
is disrupted. But because people with aphasia have difficulty communicat-
107 The National Aphasia Association, ‘Aphasia Frequently  Asked Questions,’  [s.p.], 
available  at:  http://www.aphasia.org/Aphasia%20Facts/aphasia_faq.html  (last 
accessed on 4 February 2013). See also Georg Newesely, ‘Über das Verbale hinaus-
gehende  rechtliche  Willensbekundungen  durch  Personen  mit  Sprachstörungen’, 
Globale Sicherheit  und proaktiver  Staat—Die Rolle  der  Rechtsinformatik,  Tagungs-
band des 13. Internationalen Rechtsinformatik Symposions IRIS 2010, eds. Erich Sch-
weighofer,  Anton Geist,  & Ines Staufer  (Wien:  Österreichische  Computergesell-
schaft, 2010), 574-575, 573-578.
108 See  Newesely,  ‘Über  das Verbale  hinausgehende rechtliche  Willensbekundungen 
durch Personen mit Sprachstörungen,’ 574-575, and id., ‘Willensbildung bei Per-
sonen mit einer Störung des Sprachverstehens,’ Europäische Projektkultur als Beitrag  
zur Rationalisierung des Rechts,  Tagungsband des 14. Internationalen Rechtsinform-
atik Symposions  IRIS 2011,  eds.  Erich Schweighofer  & Franz Kummer (Vienna: 
Österreichische Computer Gesellschaft, 2011), 585-587.
109 The National Aphasia Association, ‘Aphasia Frequently  Asked Questions,’  [s.p.]. 
See also Newesely, ‘Über das Verbale hinausgehende rechtliche Willensbekundun-
gen durch Personen mit Sprachstörungen,’ 574.
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ing, others often mistakenly assume they are mentally ill or have mental 
retardation.’110
The following two questions are crucial for this paper: How is it pos-
sible to communicate with aphasic persons? How is it possible for them to 
communicate? Since communication usually involves more than one per-
son, these questions are interconnected. In order to answer these questions 
as clearly as possible, I shall, however, tackle them separately.
As regards communicating with aphasic persons,  The National Aphasia  
Association (US)  makes  many  helpful  suggestions,111 including  to 
‘[a]ugment speech with gesture and visual aids whenever possible.’112 How do 
aphasic  persons  communicate?  NEWESELY,  an  Austrian  lawyer  and 
speech therapist, points out that aphasic persons can be encouraged to use 
nonverbocentric communicative media, whether they are digital or not:
‘Communicative  resources  include,  for  instance,  the  deployment of  the 
body’s  own alternative  forms of  communication and the application of 
non-electronic  and  electronic  communicative  aids.  Especially  nonverbal 
forms of communication are practically relevant for aphasic persons. They 
can  make  statements  with  their  body’s  own  forms  of  communication 
through conventional and generally agreed mimic signs, gazing and point-
ing, gestures, or possibly individual signs. As regards non-electronic com-
municative aids, boards, books, and posters can be applied, they contain a 
system of  symbolic  signs,  such  as  the  alphabet,  PECS,  TEACHH,  or 
BLISS,  or drawings and photographs, which are organized according to 
content-related aspects. In response to a question, the aphasic person indic-
ates the right answer on a communication board or looks at it.’113
110 Ibid. Similarly, see Newesely, ‘Über das Verbale hinausgehende rechtliche Willens-
bekundungen durch Personen mit Sprachstörungen,’ 574.
111 See The National Aphasia Association, ‘Communicating With People Who Have 
Aphasia:  Some  “Do’s  &  Dont’s”,’  [s.p.],  available  at:  http://www.aphasia.org/ 
Aphasia%20Facts/communicating_with_people_who_have_aphasia.html  (last 
accessed on 4 February 2013).
112 Ibid. Similarly, see Newesely, ‘Über das Verbale hinausgehende rechtliche Willens-
bekundungen durch Personen mit Sprachstörungen,’ 575-576, and id., ‘Willensb-
ildung bei Personen mit einer Störung des Sprachverstehens,’ 587, 589.
113 Newesely, ‘Über das Verbale hinausgehende rechtliche Willensbekundungen durch 
Personen mit Sprachstörungen,’ 575. N.B. This passage and those cited below have 
been translated from the German.
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With  respect  to  digital  communication  devices  for  aphasic  persons, 
NEWESELY explains that ‘electronic communication aids are … portable 
computers. On a keyboard one can produce language. The communicative 
contents can be represented in different ways on the electronic device, for 
instance,  as  words,  phrases,  or  as  complete  messages.’114 Besides  verbal 
signs (words, phrases, complete messages), such a keyboard can also feature 
pictures. These verbo-pictorial keyboards are even better suited to aphasic 
persons.115
On future developments, NEWESELY comments that they ‘run in the 
direction of neurotechnology, such as brain-computer interfaces. Certain 
mental activities which lead to changes of brain activity (brain waves) trig-
ger control  operations  on a computer.  The aphasic  person can learn to 
influence certain brain waves through pushing her or his  thoughts.  The 
BCI would channel these waves from the skullcap in order to operate a 
spelling device or an oral communication program.’116
12.3.2.2.2. On legal actors with aphasia
Neurological damage, as a result of a stroke, brain tumor, head injury, or 
other causes,117 might mean that legal actors (3.1.4) suffer from expressive, 
receptive,  or  both types of  aphasia.  And given that aphasic  persons can 
have other disabilities, aphasic legal actors might also be otherwise handi-
capped. As observed, neither expressive nor receptive aphasia affects a per-
son’s  intelligence:  hence,  aphasic  legal  actors  might  still  have  cognitive 
capacity, especially those affected by expressive aphasia. They might still be 
judicious, thus possess legal capacity, and be capable of entering into legal 
transactions. As a rule, legal actors need verbal skills to act (professionally). 
Nevertheless, under certain circumstances aphasic legal actors might still be 
able to perform their duties and/or rights. The availability or non-availabil-
ity  of  digital  and non-digital  multisensory  communication  aids  (media) 
determines these circumstances.
114 Id.,  Über  das Verbale hinausgehende rechtliche Willensbekundungen durch Per-
sonen mit Sprachstörungen,’ 575-576.
115 See  id.,  ‘Über  das Verbale  hinausgehende rechtliche Willensbekundungen durch 
Personen mit Sprachstörungen,’ 576.
116 Id., ‘Über das Verbale hinausgehende rechtliche Willensbekundungen durch Per-
sonen mit Sprachstörungen,’ 576.
117 The National Aphasia Association, ‘Aphasia Frequently Asked Questions,’ [s.p.].
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How  can  one  communicate  with  aphasic  legal  actors?  NEWESELY 
makes the following suggestions for communicating complex legal and leg-
ally  relevant  contents  to  such  actors:  ‘It  can substantially  facilitate  oral 
or/and  written  language  comprehension  to  call  on  concrete  illustrative 
objects or on pictures and to use nonverbal iconographic signs (familiar 
punctuation  marks,  e.g.,  exclamation  marks,  question  marks;  arrows  to 
represent a logic sequence/procedure within block diagrams, simple Venn 
diagrams, simple flow charts, currency signs, signs for more/less to illus-
trate proportions, and so forth).’118 
How do aphasic legal actors to communicate? Commenting on Austrian 
jurisdiction,  NEWESELY  emphasises  that  legal  actors  suffering  from 
expressive aphasia are not excluded from legal dealing: ‘As far as they are 
able  to  express  their  will  through signs,  initially,  they can declare  their 
intent where there is no provision (or requirement) as to form. As regards 
declarations of intent which require a specific form, they are able to make 
them in accordance with pertinent legal provisions, such as a notarial act 
or a notarial recording.’119 In conclusion, NEWESELY notes that in addi-
tion  to  multisensory  communication  aids  much  depends  on  goodwill: 
‘Given an (exclusive) disturbance of language production, legally relevant 
declarations of intent seem to be possible, insofar as an aphasic person is 
capable of expressing her/himself nonverbally and finds an appropriate set-
ting where she/he can act out her/his remaining communicative capacities, 
and insofar as the communication partners are prepared to deal with the 
particular communication possibilities.’120
12.3.2.2.3. Multisensory brain-computer interfaces for legal actors 
with aphasia
There is an ongoing debate on whether and how brain-computer interfaces 
might improve the situation of disabled legal actors. Referring to German 
jurisdiction, SPRANGER, a German legal scholar and political scientist, 
has recently observed the beginning of a debate ‘on how to improve the 
118 Newesely, ‘Willensbildung bei Personen mit einer Störung des Sprachverstehens,’ 
589-590. See also id., ‘Willensbildung bei Personen mit einer Störung des Sprac-
hverstehens,’ 590.
119 Newesely, ‘Willensbildung bei Personen mit einer Störung des Sprachverstehens,’ 
586.
120 Ibid.
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legal  situation of  disabled  people  through neuroscientific  insights.’121 In 
response,  he  remarks,  that  ‘if  new,  communication  channels  so  far 
undreamt of are being opened, thus the making of a legally binding declar-
ation of intent by the affected people moves in tangible closeness.’122 Cru-
cially,  however,  ‘It is  barely impossible to foresee the range of emerging 
legal possibilities: To begin with, from limiting possible care relationships 
over the possibility of making a declaration of consent in the doctor-pa-
tient relationship (‘informed consent’) through to a patient’s provision. It 
is possible to name countless constellations in which people with the most 
severe disabilities could regain a substantial amount of autonomy.’123
Emphatically,  ‘it  is  a  matter  of  remedying  existing  discriminations 
caused by limited possibilities for making declarations of intent.’124 Com-
menting on Austrian jurisdiction, NEWESELY states that conditional on 
‘their  concrete  clinical  picture,  aphasic  persons  might  be  able  to  make 
declarations of intent. In doing so, they might use different bodily forms 
of  communication  but  also  external  non-electronic  and electronic  aids. 
That said, aphasic persons face real obstacles both in their legal and in their 
daily lives. In the rarest cases do they find their limitations considered in 
terms of their  communicative abilities and enabling them to apply their 
remaining communicative abilities.’125 Given multisensory brain-computer 
interfaces, legal actors suffering from expressive aphasia might learn how to 
use them in legal communication.126 Thus, brain-computer interfaces con-
tribute or might contribute to maintaining or restoring the legal capacity 
of aphasic or otherwise-disabled legal actors.
121 Tade  Matthias  Spranger,  ‘Rechtliche  Implikationen  der  Generierung  und  Ver-
wendung neurowissenschaftlicher Erkentnisse,’ Von der Neuroethik zum Neurorecht? 
eds. Stephan Schleim, Tade Matthias, & Henrik Walter (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht, 2009), 209, 193-213. N.B. This passage and those cited below have 
been translated from the German.
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid.
124 Id.,  ‘Rechtliche  Implikationen  der  Generierung  und  Verwendung  neurowis-
senschaftlicher Erkentnisse,’ 209.
125 Newesely, ‘Über das Verbale hinausgehende rechtliche Willensbekundungen durch 
Personen mit Sprachstörungen,’ 578.
126 See id.,  ‘Über  das Verbale  hinausgehende rechtliche Willensbekundungen durch 
Personen mit Sprachstörungen,’ 576.
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12.3.3. Movement-controlled systems in the legal 
context
12.3.3.1. Movement-controlled systems in general: a rough 
outline
Today,  human machine-communication  is  also  possible  through  bodily 
movement,127 such as eye movement, nose movement, mouth movement, 
head movement, hand movement, finger movement, and so forth. Com-
puters  permitting  such  communication  are  subsumed  under  move-
ment-tracking  systems.128 Discussing  human-computer  interaction, 
WELSH et al. observe that this ‘is going through a period of rapid evolu-
tion.  Although  mouse,  keyboard,  and  joystick  devices  will  continue  to 
dominate for the immediate future, embodied, gestural, and tangible inter-
faces—where individuals use their body to directly manipulate information 
objects—are  rapidly  changing  the  computing  landscape.’129 They  cite  a 
number of examples to substantiate this basic point.130
127 See Feigenson & Spiesel, ‘The Juror and Courtroom of the Future,’ 118-119.
128 See Karl-Heinz Pantke et al., ‘Unterstützte Kommunikation bei erworbenen motor-
ischen  Einschränkungen,’  Mensch  und  Maschine:  Wie  Brain-Computer-Interfaces  
und andere Innovationen gelähmten Menschen kommunizieren helfen, ed. Karl-Heinz 
Pantke (Frankfurt am Main:  Mabuse-Verlag, 2010),  131-146; Julius Deutsch & 
Julia Gniffke, ‘Open Source und Freie Software als Hilfsmittel zur Unterstützten 
Kommunikation,’ Mensch und Maschine: Wie Brain-Computer-Interfaces und andere  
Innovationen  gelähmten  Menschen  kommunizieren  helfen,  ed.  Karl-Heinz  Pantke 
(Frankfurt am Main: Mabuse-Verlag, 2010), 147-162, and Christian Lange, ‘Blick-
gesteuerte Interaktion mit Peripheriegeräten—technische Lösung und ergonomis-
che Absicherung’, Mensch und Maschine: Wie Brain-Computer-Interfaces und andere  
Innovationen  gelähmten  Menschen  kommunizieren  helfen,  ed.  Karl-Heinz  Pantke 
(Frankfurt am Main: Mabuse-Verlag, 2010), 163-181.
129 Timothy N. Welsh  et  al.,  ‘Perceptual-Motor Interaction: Some Implications for 
Human-Computer Interaction,’ The Human-Computer Interaction Handbook: Fun-
damentals,  Evolving  Technologies,  and Emerging  Applications,  3rd  ed.,  ed.  Juli  A. 
Jacko (Boca Raton, London, New York, NY: CRC Press, 2012), 3, 3-20.
130 Ibid.
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12.3.3.2. Movement-controlled systems in general for legal 
actors
Legal discourse is also exploring movement-controlled systems. FEIGEN-
SON & SPIESEL,  for  instance,  comment  on  ‘using  … natural  bodily 
movements’131 to control a computer device in court: ‘If and when lawyers 
start to deploy these new kinds of display technologies in court, the effects 
will be hard to predict. By freeing trial lawyers from the laptop, mouse, 
and other paraphernalia, the technology would allow them to call up and 
display  their  pictures  while  maintaining  a  very  direct  relationship  with 
their audience. It would also let the audience watch the lawyer command 
the information—perhaps seeming to turn the lawyer into a kind of magi-
cian.’132
12.3.3.3. Eye-movement-controlled systems: a rough outline
‘Gaze  detection  refers  to  determining  where  a  person  is  looking  and is 
principally  the domain of  computer  vision.’133 SMI SensoMotoric  Instru-
ments, a company developing gaze- and eye-tracking systems,134 speaks of 
visual touch.135 In more precise sensory terms, I would rather talk about 
visual-kinaesthetic touch in human-machine communication. 
Eye-tracking systems are used for different purposes, such as ‘[e]duca-
tion (especially  when combined with voice  inputs)’,  ‘[r]esearch (such as 
microscopes with eye control)’, ‘[g]aming (gaze control strategy and simu-
lator  PC games)’,  ‘[k]iosk (keyboard replacement)’,  and ‘[a]ssistive  (gaze 
interaction  for  the  physically  challenged)’.136 Eye-movement-controlled 
systems are particularly helpful for people with motor impairments.
131 Feigenson & Spiesel, ‘The Juror and Courtroom of the Future,’ 118-119.
132 Id., ‘The Juror and Courtroom of the Future,’ 119.
133 Andrew D.  Wilson, ‘Sensor-  and Recognition-Based Input for Interaction,’ The  
Human-Computer Interaction Handbook: Fundamentals, Evolving Technologies, and 
Emerging Applications, 3rd ed., ed. Julie A. Jacko (Boca Raton, London, New York, 
NY: CRC Press, 2012), 137, 133-156.
134 See http://www.smivision.com/ (last accessed on 4 February 2013).
135 SMI  SensoMotoric  Instruments,  ‘Applications,  Gaze-Based  Interaction,  Visual 
Touch—Your Look Turned into Action,’ available at: http://www.smivision.com/ 
en/gaze-and-eye-tracking-systems/applications/gaze-based-interaction.html  (last 
accessed on 4 February 2013).
136 Ibid.
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The so-called Tobii Ceye, a screen-keyboard featuring pictures and let-
ters, 137 ‘allows the user to just look at the display and control the mouse by 
blinking,  dwelling  and using  the  switch.’138 With  the  help  of  this  eye-
movement-controlled screen-keyboard, persons who are both aphasic and 
paralysed could also convert its pictures into written text or speech.
12.3.3.4. Eye movement-controlled systems for paralysed legal 
actors with aphasia
According to NEWESELY, legal actors suffering from both aphasia and 
paralysis might use eye-movement-controlled systems: ‘through simply fix-
ing their gaze on a screen keyboard, they can choose a symbol.’139 Depend-
ing on the respective jurisdiction, such multisensory digital media could 
enable or indeed re-enable aphasic and paralysed legal actors to produce 
legal consequences.
12.4. Further relevance of multisensory digital 
media to the law
This section briefly considers how multisensory digital media are or might 
be  further  legally  relevant.  I  discuss  these  questions  in  terms  of  the 
strengths,  weaknesses,  opportunities,  and threats  of  multisensory  digital 
media. I restrict myself to the examples given in this paper, which clearly 
indicate that these media have or might have different impacts on the law.
137 See Sierra Monica B., ‘Tobii Launches Devices with Symbols and Text to Speech 
Converter,’ 29 January 2009, available at: http://www.techpin.com/tobii-launches-
devices-with-symbols-and-text-to-speech-converter/  (last  accessed  on  4  February 
2013).
138 Ibid. See also tobii, ‘Independence with an Eye, Disabilities, Stroke/Aphasia,’ avail-
able  at:  http://www.tobii.com/en/assistive-technology/global/disabilities/com-
mon-disabilities/strokeaphasia/ (last accessed on 4 February 2013), and tobii ATI, 
‘Independence with an Eye: Products, Tobii CEye Eye Control Module,’ available 
at:  http://www.tobii.com/en/assistive-technology/north-america/products/hardware 
/ceye-eye-control-module/ (last accessed on 4 February 2013).
139 Newesely, ‘Über das Verbale hinausgehende rechtliche Willensbekundungen durch 
Personen mit Sprachstörungen,’ 576.
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12.4.1. Strengths
Improvement of truth seeking and finding. The second Bloody Sunday trial 
illustrates the use of ‘virtual reality as multisensory evidence’ (3.1.2) and 
shows  how  multisensory  digital  media  may  improve  truth  seeking  and 
finding.
Empowerment, inclusion, and participation. There is no space to define 
the term empowerment in depth. Its different meanings depend on the vari-
ous  discourses  exploring  it.  However,  the above examples  (3.1.4, 3.2.1, 
and 3.3.4) suggest that it makes sense to draw on disability studies and spe-
cial  needs  education.  From  their  perspectives,  empowerment  refers  to 
authorising and to enabling persons with disabilities.140 Empowering such 
persons leads to their inclusion and participation.141 Multisensory virtual 
realities for blind legal actors, brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) for legal 
actors  with aphasia,  and eye-movement-controlled  systems for  paralysed 
legal actors with aphasia foster their social  and legal empowerment,  and 
therefore their inclusion and participation in society and legal life.
Mental,  emotional,  and  physical  well-being.  From  the  perspective  of 
therapeutic jurisprudence,142 the above multisensory digital media promote 
140 See,  for  instance,  Eberhard  Grüning,  ‘Emotionale  Kompetenz  in  Empower-
ment-Prozessen,’  Empowerment  behinderter  Menschen:  Theorien,  Konzepte,  Best-
Practice, eds. Wolfram Kulig, Kerstin Schirbort, & Michael Schubert (Stuttgart: W. 
Kohlhammer, 2011), 189, 189-200.
141 See, for instance, Werner Schlummer, ‘Empowerment—Grundlage für erfolgreiche 
Mitwirkung  und  Teilhabe’,  Empowerment  behinderter  Menschen:  Theorien,  
Konzepte, Best-Practice, eds. Wolfram Kulig, Kerstin Schirbort, & Michael Schubert 
(Stuttgart:  W.  Kohlhammer,  2011),  31-46;  Harald  Goll,  ‘Menschenbild, 
Empowerment  und  Inklusion,’  Empowerment  behinderter  Menschen:  Theorien,  
Konzepte, Best-Practice, eds. Wolfram Kulig, Kerstin Schirbort, & Michael Schubert 
(Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 2011), 109-118, and Otto Speck, ‘Soziale Inklusion 
als  pädagogische  Idee  und  gesellschaftliche  Herausforderung,’  Empowerment  
behinderter Menschen: Theorien, Konzepte, Best-Practice, eds. Wolfram Kulig, Ker-
stin Schirbort & Michael Schubert (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 2011), 285-294.
142 On therapeutic jurisprudence, see, for instance, Bruce J. Winick, ‘Therapeutic Jur-
isprudence: Enhancing the Relationship Between Law and Psychology’,  Law and 
Psychology: Current Legal Legal Issues 2006, Vol. 9, eds. Belinda Brooks-Gordon & 
Michael Freeman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 32-36, 30-48. See also 
Brunschwig,  ‘Multisensory  Law and  Therapeutic  Jurisprudence,’ 715-717  (with 
further references).
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the mental,  emotional,  and  physical  well-being  of  legal  actors,  whether 
they have special needs or not.
12.4.2. Weaknesses
Multisensory brain-computer interfaces have started being developed and, 
by implication, still  require development.143 Only exceptionally are para-
lysed legal  actors  with aphasia  able to benefit  from multisensory  digital 
media and from brain-computer interfaces in particular.144
12.4.3. Opportunities
Since the development of multisensory digital media and especially brain-
computer interfaces has only just begun, these media may quite possibly 
develop further not only in the present but also in the future. Thus, a BBC 
technology report on Mooly Eden, president of Intel Israel, notes that he 
‘calls  his  latest  venture  perceptual [my  emphasis]  computing—and  it 
involves controlling computers with gestures—with your voice, even with 
your eyes.’145
Such  ‘perceptual  computing’,146 ‘cognitive  computing’,147 or  indeed 
multisensory computing will ultimately also change interpersonal commu-
nication.  By  implication,  multisensory  digital  media  might  prove  even 
more useful to legal actors, whether they have special needs or not.148 The 
constant progression of multisensory digital media might even allow legal 
actors  to  benefit  even  more  significantly  from  ongoing  developments. 
Time will tell just how and in which directions.
143 See  Newesely,  ‘Über  das Verbale  hinausgehende rechtliche  Willensbekundungen 
durch Personen mit Sprachstörungen,’ 576.
144 See id.,  ‘Über  das Verbale  hinausgehende rechtliche Willensbekundungen durch 
Personen mit Sprachstörungen,’ 578.
145 BBC  News  Technology,  Tech,  ‘CES  2013:  Intel’s  drive  for  “perceptual 
computing”,’ 9 January 2013, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-
20966923 (last accessed on 4 February 2013).
146 Ibid.
147 Meyerson, ‘The IBM Next 5 in 5,’ [s.p.].
148 See  Newesely,  ‘Über  das Verbale  hinausgehende rechtliche  Willensbekundungen 
durch Personen mit Sprachstörungen,’ 576; Newesely expresses his hopes especially 
regarding the needs of aphasic persons.
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12.4.4. Threats
As far as I can see, threats lie largely in the cultural environment and con-
sequently also in the legal context:
Threats in the cultural environment. To understand the threats in the cul-
tural environment, it is necessary to consider the senses not only ‘from a 
purely physical  and personal psychological  perspective’.149 We must also 
become aware of ‘how sensory experience may be collectively patterned by 
cultural ideology and practice’.150 Thus, we can perceive a ‘hegemony of 
vision in Western culture’.151 Discussing this hypervisualism,152 CLASSEN 
observes that ‘modern Western culture is a culture of the eye. We are con-
stantly bombarded, seduced, and shaped by visual models and representa-
tions, from maps and graphs to pictures and texts’.153 This hypervisualism 
has serious implications, since the ‘rule of sight carries with it a powerful 
aura of rationality and objectivity, even though many of its contemporary 
manifestations,  such as advertising images, seem designed to manipulate 
the emotions more than to encourage the exercise of reason.’154
Overemphasising  sight  or  vision  also  affects  scholarly  discourses  and 
helps explain their strong verbo- and ocularocentric tendencies. HOWES, 
a Canadian anthropologist of the senses, warns that ‘Just as scientists usu-
ally fail to consider cultural factors in their study of perception, they usu-
ally  fail  to  recognize  that  science  itself  is  a  product  of  culture.’155 The 
impact is far-reaching, so HOWES, because ‘scientific paradigms, in fact, 
are themselves heavily influenced by perceptual paradigms … Today we 
are  so  accustomed  to  scientific  visualism  that  we  scarcely  ever  feel  the 
desire for any other perceptual paradigms of the world.’156 In sum, the cur-
149 David Howes,  Sensual  Relations:  Engaging  the  Senses  in  Culture  & Social  Theory 
(Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press: 2010), XI.
150 Howes, Sensual Relations, XI.
151 Id., Sensual Relations, XII.
152 Id. Sensual Relations, XIII.
153 Constance  Classen,  The  Color  of  Angels:  Cosmology,  gender  and  the  aesthetic  
imagination (London, New York, NY: Routledge, 1998), 1.
154 Ibid.
155 David Howes, ‘Introduction: Empires of the Senses,’ Empire of the Senses: The Sen-
sual Culture Reader, ed. David Howes (Oxford, New York, NY: Berg, 2006), 5.
156 Ibid.
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rent ocularocentrism in Western culture may be seen to threaten any other 
uni- or rather multisensory paradigm.
Threats in the legal context. BENTLY tentatively suggests that law is ocu-
larocentric.157 As shown (1.1.2),  some legal  scholars  argue that a ‘visual 
turn’  is  occurring  in  the legal  context.158 These  voices  carry  substantial 
weight,  since  they  stem  from  law  professors  whose  publications  enjoy 
broad reception. In other words, their insights are widely quoted or para-
phrased in relevant publications. From the perspective of the sociology of 
science,  such  acclaim  is  not  irrelevant:  members  of  the  scientific  com-
munity  tend to follow the views  of  widely  recognised  (and often-cited) 
scholars.159
The illustration consists of two images. I have embedded Lucas Cranach 
The Elder’s  Justice  as  a  Naked Woman with Sword and Scales  (1537) 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Gerechtigkeit-1537.jpg) in the image of 
157 Bently, ‘Introduction,’ 5-6.
158 Sherwin, Visualizing Law in the Age of the Digital Baroque, 11. See also Feigenson 
& Spiesel, Law on Display, 13-17.
159 See Peter Weingart,  Wissenschaftssoziologie (Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2003), 32-
33.
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the eye (see http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Eye_ iris.jpg).  Both 
pictures are in the public domain.
Those  questioning  such  an  ocularocentric  view  therefore  risk  being 
ignored, marginalised, or excessively criticised. Thus, scholars favouring a 
multisensory perspective on law and questioning verbo- and ocularocentric 
perspectives may experience such a fate. Even if they manage to illustrate a 
doubtless  existing trend toward multisensory legal  communication prac-
tices,  this  might  be  to  no  great  avail.  Scholarly  dogmas  and  scientific 
paradigms are harder to break than bank vaults. Besides, the struggle for 
material  resources  in  scholarship  has  recently  further  intensfied  and 
become  overtly  fierce.160 Seen  somewhat  pessimistically,  the  established 
legal  disciplines  might well  be little  inclined  to  share  their  coffers  with 
multisensory law.
12.5. Further questions and answers
Above (1.3), I have raised several further questions: How could or rather 
should greater awareness be raised in legal discourse about the current and 
future relevance of multisensory digital media for the law? How could or 
rather  should the marginalising and disregarding  of  multisensory digital 
legal communication practices be challenged? How are the research ques-
tions raised in this paper relevant to legal discourse, particularly to legal 
history, legal informatics, legal pedagogy, legal psychology, and legal the-
ory?
Doing proper justice to these questions will require a lot more extensive 
research. For now, I limit myself to outlining brief and tentative answers. I 
shall leave open the last question (how are the research questions raised in 
this paper relevant to legal discourse?) and shall instead raise further, gener-
ally formulated questions. Such a procedure seems legitimate, because the 
last question extends to a wide range of further legal relevant topics whose 
depths cannot be foreseen.
160 Martin Reinhart, ‘Wissenschaft und Wirtschaft: Von Entdeckung zu Innovation,’ 
Handbuch Wissenschaftssoziologie,  eds.  Sabine Maasen et al. (Wiesbaden: Springer 
VS, 2012), 373-374, 365-378.
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12.5.1. How to raise greater awareness about the 
relevance of multisensory digital media for the law?
Greater awareness in legal discourse about the current and future relevance 
of multisensory digital media for the law could or rather should be raised 
in  various  ways.  Two  such  ways  are  presentations  and  discussions  at 
national  and  international  conferences,  especially  on  legal  history,  legal 
informatics, legal pedagogy, legal psychology, legal theory, and multisens-
ory law. Moreover, print and online publications will  also contribute to 
raising greater awareness of this cardinal issue among scholars. Newspaper 
articles  addressed to an interested lay audience  will  also  serve  this  goal. 
Basic and further legal education should be open to all these debates and 
integrate them into law’s curricula.
12.5.2. How to challenge the marginalising and 
ignoring of multisensory digital media?
As might have already become clear, this paper has tried to challenge the 
marginalising and ignoring of multisensory legal communication practices. 
The strongest ‘mental weapon’ to question or even defy legal verbo- and 
ocularocentrism is  to draw the attention of  the scientific  community to 
insights from the anthropology of the senses. In response to many scholarly 
turns, including the visual turn, HOWES explains that ‘The rise of sensory 
studies at the turn of the twenty-first century draws on each of these prior 
developments or “turns” but also critiques them by questioning the verbo-
centrism of the linguistic model, the ocularcentrism of the visual culture 
model, and the holism of both the corporeal and material culture models
—in which bodies and objects are often treated simply as physical wholes 
and not as bundles of interconnected experiences and properties.’
The  virtue  of  sensory  studies  approaches  is  that  they  ‘emphasize  the 
dynamic, relational (intersensory—or multimodal, multimedia) and often 
conflicted nature of our everyday engagement with the sensuous world.’161 
Law, I suggest, needs to embrace such thinking if it is to keep pace with 
human, social, and technological developments. 
161 David Howes, ‘Charting the Sensorial Revolution,’ Senses & Society, Vol. 1, Issue 1 
(2006), 115, 113-128.
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12.5.3. How are the research questions in this paper 
relevant to legal discourse?
How are the research questions raised in this paper relevant to legal dis-
course, particularly to legal history, legal informatics, legal pedagogy, legal 
psychology, and legal theory? As explained in the introduction to this sec-
tion, I shall ‘answer’ this question by raising further, generally formulated 
questions.
What  are  the historical  dimensions  of  multisensory  law?  How could 
these dimensions be explored? Which fundamental questions concerning 
law’s unisensory and  multisensory dimensions in legal history should be 
raised? Which subject matters should be treated?
How are  legal  informatics  and multisensory  law related?  How could 
these legal disciplines cross-fertilise one another? Particularly, which addi-
tional  questions  should multisensory  law raise  and which  insights  from 
other  disciplines  intra or  extra  muros should multisensory  law adopt  to 
stimulate the discourse of legal informatics?
How can the relationship between multisensory law and legal pedagogy 
(legal education) be characterised? How should multisensory law and its 
various branches (i.e., visual law, audio-visual law, tactile-kinaesthetic law, 
and  so  forth)  play  a  significant  part  in  transforming  legal  education? 
Which fundamental questions should multisensory law address to sustain-
ably support this process of transformation?
How are multisensory law and (legal) psychology related? What is the 
psychological  impact of  multisensory media on the law,  be these media 
digital or not? In terms of therapeutic jurisprudence, do they have positive 
(i.e. ‘therapeutic’) or negative (i.e. ‘anti-therapeutic’) consequences? If so, 
in which sense?
How should the theory of multisensory law be designed? That is, how 
could  the  ‘sensorial  poverty  of  contemporary  [legal;  my insertion]  the-
ory’162 be remedied? If such a theoretical venture were undertaken, what 
162 Howes, ‘Introduction: Empires of the Senses,’ 1. Howe’s observation refers to the-
ory in general. Given its poignancy, I take the liberty of transferring it to the legal 
context.
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would  a ‘sensational  jurisprudence’163 or  rather  a  multisensory  jurispru-
dence, that is, a multisensory legal theory look like?
12.6. Findings, conclusions, and outlook
12.6.1. Findings
This  paper  has  shown  that  multisensory  digital  media  impact  the  law. 
Already now a trend exists toward the law as a multisensory phenomenon, 
that is,  toward multisensory digital  legal  communication practices.  This 
trend  might  grow  in  future.  As  described  below,  multisensory  digital 
media  have  and  might  have  a  further  bearing  on  the  law  in  terms  of 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats.
12.6.1.1. Strengths and weaknesses
Multisensory digital media contribute to better truth seeking and finding. 
These media also promote social  and legal empowerment, and therefore 
the inclusion and participation of legal  actors  with special  needs.  These 
media  help  promote  the  mental,  emotional,  and  physical  well-being  of 
legal actors, whether they have special needs or not.
Certain multisensory  digital  media,  such as brain-computer  interfaces 
require  further  development.  Along  these  lines,  they  still  appear  quite 
weak. A further weakness is that these media are neither readily not widely 
available to legal actors with special needs.
12.6.1.2. Opportunities and threats
It is, however, highly possible that multisensory digital media will develop 
further in the future. Thus, legal actors with or without special needs will 
have the opportunity of  benefitting from such media to an even greater 
extent. This paper has also shown that greater awareness of the current and 
future relevance of multisensory digital media can be raised variously in the 
legal discourse. As shown, the anthropology of the senses fundamentally 
questions  the  verbo-  and  ocularocentrism  of  Western  (legal)  culture. 
Drawing attention to these insights, this paper challenges the marginalising 
163 Lionel  Bently  & Leo Flynn (eds.),  Law and the Senses:  Sensational Jurisprudence 
(London, Chicago, IL: Pluto Press 1996).
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and ignoring of multisensory legal communication practices. I am confid-
ent that the questions and answers suggested here are relevant and offer 
other legal disciplines the opportunity for cognitive and emotional growth 
(such disciplines  include legal  history,  legal  informatics,  legal  pedagogy, 
legal psychology, and legal theory).
Brain-computer  interfaces  might  also  pose  a  threat  to  legal  discourse 
because they potentially allow for obtaining private information from our 
brains.164 AUSTIN warns that ‘[l]aw schools ought to be in the vanguard 
of the movement to take advantage of digital technologies’ power to argue 
and persuade. If law schools fail to seize the initiative, the entire profession 
will lag behind.’165 Such a failure would pose a further threat. The current 
verbo- and ocularocentrism of Western culture in general and in legal cul-
ture in particular essentially threatens the new multisensory legal paradigm. 
As far as I can see, this is one of the greatest threats. From the perspective 
of the sociology of science, the established disciplines of the applicable law 
and/or the basic legal disciplines may resist (acknowledging) the emergence 
of multisensory law. The current struggle for material resources in the aca-
demic context has become a grim battle. In institutional terms, multisens-
ory law’s position is still weak. It is therefore under threat and perhaps not 
equipped to wage—let alone win—such an existential fight.
12.6.2. Conclusions
I warmly recommend not only legal research and teaching, but also legal 
practice and legislation to adopt this paper’s insights. What does or would 
this mean?
12.6.2.1. Turn to all sensory legal communication practices
Legal research, teaching, and practice should doubtless explore the law as a 
unisensory  (i.e., visual,  auditory,  tactile,  and  so  forth)  phenomenon. 
Today,  particularly  visual  legal  communication  practices  need  to  be 
164 Ivan Martinovic et  al.,  ‘On the Feasibility of Side-Channel  Attacks with Brain-
Computer Interfaces,’ 21st USENIX Security Symposion, August 8-10, 2012, avail-
able  at  https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity12/feasibility-side-chan-
nel-attacks-brain-computer-interfaces (last accessed on 4 February 2013).
165 Regina Austin, ‘The Next “New Wave”: Law-Genre Documentaries, Lawyering in 
Support of the Creative Process, and Visual Legal Advocacy,’ Fordham Intell. Prop.  
Media & Ent. L.J., Vol. 16 (2006), 868, 809-868.
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explored, whether they are digital or not. Such exploration would involve 
studying legal norm images, legal visualisations in court judgments, legal 
visualisations in legal research and education, legal visualisations in private 
legal practice (e.g., legal visualisations in contracts), legal visualisations in 
e-government and e-justice, visual evidence in civil and criminal proced-
ure, visual legal culture, and so forth.
In addition, legal research, teaching, and practice should turn to the law 
as a multisensory (i.e., audio-visual, tactile-kinaesthetic, visual-kinaesthetic, 
and so forth) phenomenon, that is, to multisensory legal communication 
practices, be they digital or not. In so doing, jurisprudence and legal prac-
tice would need to draw from various legal and non-legal disciplines.166
12.6.2.2. Transformation of literacies
The term literacy originally only referred to the ability of human beings to 
read  and  write.167 Given  the  advent  of  the  new  uni-  and multisensory 
digital media,  verbal literacy and particularly verbal legal literacy need to 
be transformed.
Transformation  of  verbal  literacy.  Existing  literacies  need  to  be  trans-
formed,  especially  in  educational  settings.  Already  in  2003,  HOCKS 
argued that ‘when we bring an understanding of  digital  rhetoric  to our 
classrooms, we need to expand our approach not only to rhetorical criti-
cism but also  to  text  production.’168 Crucially,  ‘digital  technologies  can 
encourage  what  the  New  London  School  theorists  call  a  multimodal 
approach  to  literacy,  where  using  communication  technologies  engages 
students in a multisensory experience and active construction of knowledge. 
To use multimedia technologies effectively,  writers  have to use practices 
that  are  not  just  verbal  but  visual,  spatial,  aural,  and gestural  to  make 
meaning … [my emphases].’169
Reflecting on the seminal achievements of the New London School the-
orists, HOCKS asserts that they ‘make a powerful case for redefining liter-
166 See, for instance, Sherwin, ‘A Manifesto for Visual Legal Reelism,’ 720, and Feigen-
son & Spiesel, Law on Display, xii-xiii.
167 See Paul Messaris,  Visual ‘Literacy’:  Image, Mind, and Reality (Boulder, CO, San 
Francisco, CA, and Oxford: Westview Press, 1994), 2.
168 Mary E. Hocks, ‘Understanding Visual Rhetoric in Digital Writing Environments,’ 
College Composition and Communication, Vol. 54, No. 4 (2003), 644, 629-656.
169 Ibid.
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acy practice and attending to the political and social impact made possible 
by  technologies  as  complex  artifacts  that  can  help  transform  our  lived 
experience.’170 And, importantly as regards teaching and its transformation, 
‘Their approach to pedagogy suggests that students can work from within 
their diverse cultures and multiple identities using their own languages as 
well  their  everyday lived experiences to design and new kinds of know-
ledge.’171
I agree with HOCKS, with the exception of  her verbocentric  or lan-
guage-centred terminology. She refers to ‘text production’ perhaps because 
she  is  a  professor  of  English,  that  is,  a  language-oriented  scholar.  As 
HOCKS suggests, today such production also involves producing images, 
be  they  still  or  dynamic,  accompanied  by  sounds  and  written  and/or 
spoken words. Neither can one write pictures nor ‘write with pictures’,172 
as FEIGENSON & SPIESEL claim.173 Such a verbo- or logocentric per-
spective underestimates the iconic properties (iconicity) of pictures. Icon-
icity should not be reduced to verbalism—not even metaphorically. Thus, 
HOCKS concedes that ‘… the process of design is fundamentally visual 
and  multimodal,  it  can be  challenging,  but  it  leads  students  to  a  new 
understanding of how designed spaces and artifacts impact audiences.’174
Transformation  of  verbal  legal  literacy.  Contemplating  our  digital  age, 
SHERWIN postulates that ‘much of the content and many tools of legal 
meaning  making  have  changed  from what  they  once  were.’175 This,  he 
argues, means that ‘the education of lawyers, judges, and citizens must fol-
low suit.’176 I would support SHERWIN’s claim that we should ‘respect 
the  medium’.177 What  does  this  mean?  Shifting  from  one  medium  to 
another,  SHERWIN suggests,  means  that  ‘we  not  only  encounter  new 
content,  we also  become accustomed to  new ways  of  experiencing  and 
thinking about that content.’178 In our present context, this means that we 
170 Ibid.
171 Hocks, ‘Understanding Visual Rhetoric in Digital Writing Environments,’ 644.
172 Feigenson & Spiesel, Law on Display, 131.
173 See also id., Law on Display, 23, 83.
174 Hocks, ‘Understanding Visual Rhetoric in Digital Writing Environments,’ 652.
175 Sherwin, ‘A Manifesto for Visual Legal Reelism,’ 743,
176 Ibid.
177 Id., ‘A Manifesto for Visual Legal Reelism,’ 736.
178 Ibid.
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should respect  multisensory digital  media and their  implications for  the 
law, specifically their effects on legal and legally relevant thinking, learn-
ing, content production, reception, and assessment.
The transformation of verbal legal literacy should start with integrating 
visual legal literacy. There are many definitions of visual literacy.179 Gener-
ally,  it  involves  ‘visual  thinking,  visual  learning,  and visual  communica-
tion.’180 Hence,  legal  visual  literacy should include visual legal thinking, 
visual legal learning, and visual legal communication. In its communicative 
aspect, visual literacy also concerns ‘the ability to intelligently decode mes-
sages embedded in visual forms’181 and the ‘ability to actively generate new 
visual  forms  for  communication.’182 Consequently,  visual  legal  literacy 
should encompass  the capacity  to  create,  analyse,  and assess  visual  legal 
communication. 
As regards legal education, SPIESEL, SHERWIN, & FEIGENSON ask 
‘just what is it that law students need to know when it comes to images?’183 
In response, they suggest that ‘law students need to learn what images are, 
how they are perceived and interpreted, and how they propagate through 
the culture like sporulating fungi.’184 Such literacy is crucial, they further 
argue,  since  ‘legal  professionals  rarely  understand  the  images  they  use 
because visual literacy has not been part of their education; has not been 
regarded as an essential skills set.’185
SUH’s reflections on the usefulness of visual literacy should be trans-
ferred to the legal context: ‘It can be argued that visual literacy is useful 
primarily for purposes of self-defense, as a knowledge base for resisting and 
179 On visual literacy, see, for instance, Messaris, Visual Literacy,’ 1-40.
180 Taewon Suh, ‘Visual Persuasion,’ Communication Research Trends, Vol. 19, No. 3 
(1999), 13, 4-18.
181 Suh, ‘Visual Persuasion,’ 14.
182 Ibid.
183 Christina O. Spiesel, Richard K. Sherwin, & Neal Feigenson, ‘Law in the Age of 
Images: The Challenge of Visual Literacy,’  Contemporary Issues of the Semiotics of  
Law: Cultural and Symbolic Analyses of Law in a Global Context, eds. Anne Wagner, 
Tracey Summerfield, & Farid Benavides Vanegas (Oxford: Hart Pub, 2005), 246, 
231-255.
184 Id., ‘Law in the Age of Images,’ 246.
185 Ibid. On visual legal literacy, see also Feigenson & Spiesel, Law on Display, 17, 195, 
214, and 217, and Sherwin, Visualizing Law in the Age of the Digital Baroque, 3, 5, 
11, 23, 33, 147, and 187.
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counteracting  the  baneful  influence  of  mendacious  ads,  sensationalistic 
movies, and the like.’ Countering this somewhat pessimistic perspective, he 
argues that ‘by acquiring visual literacy people enrich their repertoires of 
cognitive  skills  and  gain  access  to  powerful  new  tools  of  creative 
thought’.186
Along these lines, WALTER, in a recent paper on neuroimaging, claims 
that future judges should learn ‘the fundamental difference between func-
tional and structural images.’187 One could think about how visual legal lit-
eracy could otherwise be useful.
Thus,  transforming  verbal  legal  literacy  toward  visual  legal  literacy 
should extend to what I would call audio-visual legal literacy and multis-
ensory legal literacy. In the end, multisensory legal literacy would involve 
all sensory legal literacies.
12.6.2.3. Handling multisensory digital media
On the one hand, we need to welcome multisensory digital media in the 
legal context with open hearts and minds. On the other hand, we need to 
ensure that we do not aggrandise or exaggerate their present or actual cap-
abilities.188 Further, we need to be careful about assuming—prematurely—
that we fully understand these media.189 What is needed, on balance, is a 
critical approach to multisensory digital media.
12.6.2.4. Acting in conformity with the law
The application of multisensory digital media requires close attention to 
ensuring conformity with the law.190 Thus,  if  deemed appropriate or  in 
fact necessary, multisensory digital media could also aid the search for new 
court decisions and legislative activities which, however, should be well-ad-
apted to the prevailing circumstances.
186 Suh, ‘Visual Persuasion,’ 14.
187 Walter, ‘Was können wir messen?’ 80 (my translation).
188 See id., ‘Was können wir messen?’ 78.
189 Ibid.
190 Tade  Matthias  Spranger,  ‘Rechtliche  Implikationen  der  Generierung  und  Ver-
wendung  neurowissenschaftlicher  Erkenntnisse,’ Von  der  Neuroethik  zum 
Neurorecht? eds. Stephan Schleim, Tade Matthias Spranger, & Henrik Walter (Göt-
tingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009), 211, 193-213.
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12.6.3. Outlook
12.6.3.1. There is more to come
12.6.3.1.1. General remarks
Based on our recent experiences with digital media, we know that there is 
more to come. The ‘digital revolution’ is ongoing191 and involves the fur-
ther rapid development of digital media. These developments ‘are not just 
local  but  global.’192 Along  with  HENDERSON & EPSTEIN,  I  would 
anticipate ‘more developments for the future in the future’.193
MEYERSON  predicts  that  ‘computers  will  mimic  the  senses’.  As 
regards touch and movement, ‘[y]ou will be able to reach out and touch 
through your phone’. As regards sight, ‘[a] pixel will be worth a thousand 
words’.  As  regards  hearing,  ‘[c]omputers  will  hear  what  matters’.  As 
regards  taste,  ‘[d]igital  taste  buds  will  help  you  to  eat  healthier’.  And, 
finally, as regards smell, ‘[c]omputers will have a sense of smell’.194 From a 
scholarly  perspective,  MEYERSON’s  predictions  require  closer  scrutiny 
and  more  sophisticated  rephrasing.  None  the  less,  they  help  anticipate 
highly likely paths of development.
Poignantly, SHERWIN wonders ‘how long law schools will persist in 
the pretense that law remains exclusively a matter of words, regardless of 
whether we speak of “law in the books” or “law in action”, only time will 
tell.’195 In response, he sounds a warning note worth observing: ‘But the 
longer  this ostrich-like behaviour continues within the hall  of legal  aca-
demia, the further legal training will retreat from the practical realities of 
legal practice.’196
191 Wahlgren, ‘Visualization of the Law,’ 20.
192 Carol Henderson & Jules Epstein, ‘Preface,’ The Future of Evidence: How Science & 
Technology Will Change the Practice of Law, eds.  Carol Henderson & Jules Epstein 
(Chicago, IL: American Bar Association, 2011), ix.
193 Id., ‘Preface,’ xi.
194 Meyerson, ‘The IBM Next 5 in 5,’ [s.p.].
195 Sherwin, ‘A Manifesto for Visual Legal Realism,’ 725.
196 Sherwin, ‘A Manifesto for Visual Legal Realism,’ 725.
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12.6.3.1.2. Examples
Here are a few examples of what more is to come, presented in the order 
discovered:
Virtual  realities. Already in 1992, STEUER observed: ‘Given the great 
attention such technologies have achieved in recent years, it seems safe to 
assume that substantial advances will be made in this direction in the near 
future.’197 As seen, virtual realities are involving increasingly more senses. 
On the promise that such realities hold out, STEUER asserts that such 
‘New technologies promise to expand both the sensory breadth and depth 
of mediated experience … The ramifications of media systems whose rep-
resentations are perceptually indistinguishable from their real-world coun-
terparts are both exciting and terrifying—exciting because of the possibilit-
ies afforded by such systems to experience distant and nonexistent worlds, 
and terrifying because of the blurring of distinction between representation 
and reality.’198 As discussed (3.1.2), these multisensory virtual realities serve 
or might serve as multisensory evidence.
Leap motion. The Leap Motion Controller enables humans to interact with 
a computer ‘in three dimensions using just … hand and finger movements 
and Leap Motion enabled software.’199 Leap Motion allows users to design 
visual content through hand and finger movements. Making these move-
ments, users are able to scroll, zoom, and rotate objects, without having to 
touch  the  screen.  Moreover,  one  or  several  fingers  can  be  used  as  a 
mouse.200 I  could  imagine  law  professors  using  this  visual-kinaesthetic 
digital medium for teaching purposes, for instance, for drawing rather than 
reading legal concepts for their students’ benefit. Practising lawyers might 
use this medium to present evidence in court.
Electronic  nose. An electronic nose ‘is  an electronic instrument that  is 
capable of detecting and recognizing many gazes and odors, and comprises 
a sensor array using several chemosensors and a computer.’201 Moreover, 
197 Steuer, ‘Defining Virtual Reality,’ 83.
198 Id., ‘Defining Virtual Reality,’ 84.
199 https://leapmotion.com/product;  see  also http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-
20987236 (both websites last accessed on 4 February 2013).
200 See https://leapmotion.com/ (last accessed on 4 February 2013).
201 H. Nanto & J. R. Stetter, ‘Introduction to Chemosensors,’ Handbook of Machine  
Olfaction: Electronic Nose Technology, eds. Tim C. Pearce et al. (Weinheim: Wiley-
VCH, 2003), 79, 79-104.
278
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND OUTLOOK
‘[a] chemosensor is a device that is capable of converting a chemical quant-
ity into an electrical  signal  and respondate the concentration of specific 
particles such as atoms, molecules, or ions in gases or liquids by providing 
an electrical signal.’202 MARKS points out the growing legal significance of 
electronic  noses:  ‘Olfactory  surveillance—the  monitoring  of  personal 
odour—is on the increase. The number of dogs trained in the detection of 
criminal suspects and substances is growing. But dogs aren’t the only tool 
envisioned for the future. … Companies across the globe are designing and 
touting ‘electronic noses’,  machines that seek to mimic the mammalian 
sensory apparatus, in an attempt to satisfy new security demands.’203 Pla-
cing electronic noses in a wider context, MARKS states that ‘once referred 
to as the ‘neglected sense’, the science of olfaction is experiencing a resur-
gence of interest and researchers predict that, in the near future, our know-
ledge of it will rival that of visual sciences.’204 Citing biologist Lyall Wat-
son, who considers the crucial role of the olfactory system, MARKS adds 
that ‘there is a general and universal system of chemical communication in 
which all  living things are involved.’205 This system, she continues, pro-
duces ‘“a coordinated ecological mechanism for the regulation of who goes 
where, and how many can afford to do so.” The security services want to 
tap into this primordial information, then exchange and use it in border 
controls and the wars on crime, terrorism and antisocial behaviour. Wat-
son predicts  that  a heightened olfactory consciousness  will  enable us to 
“get to know who the good guys are.” The security services seem to think 
the science of olfaction is already sufficiently advanced to enable them to 
do this.’206
China, for instance, ‘has established a “scent bank” of odours sampled 
from criminal suspects and crime scenes. According to a document leaked 
to The Observer, GCHQ, the British intelligence agency, has been evaluat-
ing  the  merits  of  odour  as  a  means  of  personal  identification.’207 As 
MARKS further notes, delicate legal questions are involved:
‘The supreme court of South Australia dismissed the argument that a 
dog “sniff” is an invasion of privacy on the basis that odours emitted from 
a person are routinely exposed to the perception of the public at large. But 
this  reasoning  ignores  the  fact  that  odour  detection  “tools”—such  as 
202 Ibid.
203 Amber  Marks,  ‘Smells  suspicious,’ The  Guardian,  31  March 2008,  available  at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2008/mar/31/internationalcrime  (last  accessed 
on 4 February 2013).
204 Ibid.
205 Ibid.
206 Ibid.
207 Marks, ‘Smells suspicious,’ [s.p.].
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trained dogs and electronic noses—enable the police to perceive informa-
tion beyond the range of the human senses, placing them firmly within the 
category of “new surveillance” techniques first identified as a threat to legal 
regulators by Gary Marx, professor emeritus of sociology at the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology. According to Marx, in extending the senses, 
new surveillance “challenges fundamental assumptions about personal and 
social borders that have been maintained not only by values and norms 
and social organisation but by the limits of technology to cross them”. The 
threat is obvious: these new methods promise to render traditional invest-
igatory techniques obsolete.’208
Given these new olfactory surveillance technologies, visual-olfactory sur-
veillance might invade public space. For instance, if drugs are being con-
sumed, olfactory surveillance will alert the video camera nearby. The video 
camera will film the drug consumers. If a person urinates or litters in pub-
lic space, the same will happen. And so forth. Judges and legislators have 
always  been confronted with  new technologies  and their  legal  impacts. 
Thus, they will have to come to terms with visual-olfactory surveillance, 
too, by regulating such technology and/or adapting jurisdiction (case law) 
to it.
Brain  wave  sensors. NeuroSky,  a  thriving manufacturer  of  brain-com-
puter interfaces,  offers  brain wave sensors as  consumer product applica-
tions.209 Apparently,  these  brain  wave  sensors  are  able  to  determine 
whether we are focused or not. In connection with NeuroSky’s headsets, 
FLEMING reports that ‘several leading carmakers are exploring whether 
sensors built into the driver’s headrest can tell if he or she is drowsy to 
drive safely, based on the pattern of electrical activity in the brain. Manu-
factures are testing a system that sounds an alarm when the sensors pick up 
patterns  associated  with  sleepiness.’210 Moreover,  ‘whereas  current  EEG 
headset sensors must touch the scalp or skin to pick up the brain’s weak 
electrical signals, NeuroSky say its latest sensors can operate through fab-
ric, such as the outer layer of a vehicle’s headrest.’
208 Ibid. On the growing significance of electronic noses in the legal context, see also 
Brunschwig, ‘Multisensory Law and Legal Informatics,’ 649.
209 See http://www.neurosky.com/ (last accessed on 4 February 2013). 
210 Nic Fleming, ‘Automakers Test In-Car Brain Sensors: Manufacturers are testing a 
brain-wave-sensing system that sounds an alarm when it detects sleepiness,’  MIT 
Technology Review, 18 August 2011, available at: http://www. Technologyreview. 
com/news/425060/automakers-test-in-car-brain-sensors/?p1=A3 (last accessed on 4 
February 2013).
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3D  printing. This  generates  three-dimensional  objects  from  a  digital 
model.211 Such three-dimensional objects can be seen, touched, and per-
haps even smelled. Geomagic, for instance, ‘is a global company dedicated 
to advancing and applying 3D technology’.212 Just imagine a three-dimen-
sional representation of the facts of a case.
12.6.3.2. Legal cyberorgs—or not?
Are  we  or  will  we  become (legal)  cyberorgs?  Historian  Robert  JÜTTE 
remarks that ‘the term “cyborg” was coined as long ago as 1960 by the 
American space scientist Manfred Clynes. It combines the words “cyber-
netic” and “organism” and means more than just a symbiotic relationship 
between humans and computers. A cyborg is a machine body controlled by 
artificial intelligence, and is therefore capable of existing without the assist-
ance of human intelligence.’213 As for possible future developments, ‘it is 
questionable whether we shall ever reach the point where humans will be 
indistinguishable from computers.’214 He then refers to the German writer 
Hans Magnus Enzenberger, who had ‘words of encouragement for all who 
had nightmares at the thought of these biotechnological  fantasies of the 
future: “The body’s inertia will not let us down. Toothache is not virtual. 
We can’t eat simulation. Our own death is not a media event. So, yes, we 
may rest assured that there is still life on this side of the digital world: the 
only life we have.”’215
211 See BBC HARDtalk, ‘Ping Fu: 3D printing is as big as the internet,’ 28 January 
2013, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/hardtalk/9788066.stm, 
and  Create  it  REAL,  3D  Printing  process,  available  at:  http://www.createitreal 
.com/index.php/technology/process  (both  websites  last  accessed  on  4  February 
2013).
212 http://geomagic.com/en/about/geomagic/overview/  (last  accessed  on  4  February 
2013).
213 Robert Jütte,  A History of the Senses:  From Antiquity to Cyberspace,  transl.  James 
Lynn (Cambridge, Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2005), 335.
214 Ibid.
215 Ibid.
281
CHAPTER 12. LAW IS NOT OR MUST NOT BE JUST VERBAL AND VISUAL IN THE 21ST CENTURY: 
12.6.3.3. Ad iurisprudentiam multisensualem
Legal actors will ‘continue to grapple with the legal status of new technolo-
gies.’216 I hope that multisensory law will open the eyes of the established 
disciplines of applicable law and/or the basic legal disciplines. It could do 
so by tackling questions inadequately explored (or not at all) and by draw-
ing on insights disregarded by paradigmatic legal discourse. To a greater 
degree  and to  leave  my own ocularocentric  metaphor  (‘open  the  eyes’) 
behind, multisensory law will  contribute to opening up  all the senses of 
the established legal disciplines.
In some paintings, iustitia (justice) embraces (and kisses) pax (peace).217 
Artists,  legal  (information)  designers,  and  so  forth  might  one  day  be 
inspired to create an allegory where pax, iustitia, and sensualitas (sense, sen-
suality) embrace (and kiss) each other. Most likely, iurisprudentia verbosa et  
216 Jennifer L. Mnookin, ‘The Image of Truth: Photographic Evidence and the Power 
of Analogy,’ Yale J.L. & Human, Vol. 10, 73, 1-74. Mnookin’s observation refers 
to photography. Given its poignancy, I take the liberty of referring it to evolving 
multisensory digital media.
217 http://de.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Datei:Der_Ku%C3%9F_von_ 
Gerechtigkeit_und_Friede.jpg&filetimestamp=20080206222604,  and  http://it. 
wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Justitia_et_pax_osculatae_sunt_-_BS_-_Pinacoteca_Tosio-
Martinengo_-_foto_G._Dall%27Orto.jpg (last accessed on 4 February 2013).
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picturata (verbose and pictorial jurisprudence)218 will undergo transforma-
tion.  She will  rise  from her  somewhat  obscure  and therefore  ultimately 
inferior position, and re-emerge as iurisprudentia multisensualis (multisens-
ory  jurisprudence).  Defying  verbocentrism  and  ocularocentrism  in  the 
legal context, I close with the following desideratum:  ad iurisprudentiam 
multisensualem—toward  multisensory  jurisprudence  or  rather  toward 
multisensory law.
218 Already in the 17th and 18th centuries,  iurisprudentia picturata emerged as a legal 
discipline  that  explored  the  law  as  a  visual  phenomenon.  On  iurisprudentia  
picturata,  see, for instance, Gernot Kocher,  Zeichen und Symbole des  Rechts: Eine  
historische Ikonographie (Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 1992), 8, and Heiner Lück, 
‘Rechtssymbolik,’ Reallexikon  der  Germanischen  Altertumskunde,  Vol.  24  
Quadriburigum—Rind, eds. Heinrich Beck, Dieter Geuenich, & Heiko Steuer, 2nd 
completely revised and extended ed. (Berlin, New York, NY: Walter de Gruyter, 
2003), 284, 284-291.
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